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PUBLIC GOOD THROUGH CHARTER SCHOOLS?
Philip Hackney*
Should nonprofit charter schools be considered "charitable" under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code and be entitled to the benefits that go with that designation (income tax
exemption, charitable contribution deduction, etc.)? Current tax law treats them as such; the
question is whether there is a good rationale for this treatment. In addition to efficiency and
equity, I consider political justice as a value in evaluating tax policy. By political justice I mean
a democratic system that prioritizes the opportunity for more people to have a voice in collective
decisions (political voice equality or PVE). Thus, a tax policy that decreases PVE violates the
value of political justice. Efficiency theory and equity provide modest help in evaluating the
charter question, but the tool of political justice provides important value. When viewed in its
entirety the granting of tax exemption to charter organizations violates the norm of political
justice. The charter movement takes decision-making regarding community education away from
a community and gives it to private parties. Instead of the community controlling major
educational decisions, charter management organizations control those decisions. Still, allowing
parents to seek the form of education they deem right for their children may increase voice in
part. Additionally, valid democratic authorities across the country have chosen to provide some
education through charter vehicles. Given the strong interest in keeping tax policy in harmony
with democratically chosen policies, most ideal in this conflict would be to maintain taxexemption. However, to be charitable, a charter school and its management organization ought
to be democratically operated in some broad sense. The Article thus suggests some ways to
increase the democratic accountability of charters.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Should Congress grant charitable federal income tax-exempt status1 and the benefits of the
charitable contribution deduction2 to nonprofit charter schools? In line with a burgeoning
movement to consider the value of democracy in tax policy,3 I evaluate this question by
considering the value of political justice as democracy in addition to the traditional tax policy
factors of equity and efficiency.4 Where tax policy harms political voice equality (equality in the
opportunity to shape collective choices (PVE)) we should question that policy.5 On its face, charter
schools appear to lower PVE. Prior to a charter school opening, typically a democratically-elected
local community school board oversees the operation of the school.6 After granting charter status,
most decisions are carried out by the board of a charter school and charter school management.7
Charter proponents celebrate bringing ‘choice’ to parents and children who previously had to
accept what the public school system offered. However, from a PVE perspective, educational
decisions are taken from the community and given to a small group granted a charter. The Article
concludes that while troublesome from a political justice perspective, because so many
jurisdictions have democratically chosen to pursue schooling through charters, ending these
benefits provided to similar tax-exempt groups does not make sense. However, given the unique
role of primary and secondary public education in shaping a democratic nation, the Article
recommends Congress require charter schools to adopt provisions that would make their operation
more democratic in nature to maintain their charitable tax subsidies. It also concludes that where
nonprofits are carrying out public services on behalf of the government, Congress ought to
investigate whether granting charitable tax subsidies works to harm PVE. Where the policy harms
PVE, Congress should look for a corrective to that harm.
Because charters are nonprofits operating public schools and society has long considered
education a charitable activity, this choice to examine the charitable tax subsidies for charter
schools may seem far from intuitive and maybe even odd. However, the examination through a
political justice lens highlights a significant tension that arises when government uses charities to
carry out government functions. The move may be one by a state to avoid the very democratic
process that legitimates the authority of the state. It shows that Congress ought to take political
justice into consideration when determining whether to grant charitable tax subsidies to such
1

26 U.S.C. § 501(a) & (c)(3).
26 U.S.C. § 170.
3
See, e.g., Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN L. REV. 567, 568 (1965); James R.
Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008); Linda
Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 TAX L. REV. 617 (2016); John R. Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 TAX L. REV.
253, 253 (2018); Ari Glowgower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1449 (2018); Clinton G. Wallace, Tax
Policy and Our Democracy, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1233 (2020); Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Ari Glowgower, Ariel Jurow
Kleiman & Clinton G. Wallace, Taxation and Law and Political Economy, 83 OHIO STATE L.J. 471 (2022).
4
See, e.g., Philip Hackney, Political Justice and Tax Policy: The Social Welfare Organization Case, 8 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 271 (2021) [hereinafter Political Justice] (arguing that in conducting tax policy analysis we ought to consider
political justice in addition to efficiency and equity).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., L. HARMON ZEIGLER, M. KENT JENNINGS, & G. WAYNE PEAK, GOVERNING AMERICAN SCHOOLS:
POLITICAL INTERACTION IN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1-2 (1974) (describing the traditional school board as “the
bodies legally charged with making authoritative decisions” about school systems).
7
See, e.g., Yilan Shen, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Authorizing Charter Schools 1 (2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/AuthorizingCharterSchools.pdf.
2
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arrangements. Congress should consider whether a democratic process is central to the shaping
and delivery of the service the nonprofit is delivering. In the case of the delivery of primary and
secondary education, democracy is central to the shaping and the delivery.
Traditional tax efficiency and equity theories provide only modest help in resolving this
tax policy matter. Tax-exemption efficiency theories ask whether the nonprofit form helps to solve
market failures.8 Charter schools solve no market failure. They are financed through taxes so there
is no free rider problem to solve. The efficiency claim may be that charters are better than
traditional public schools at delivering education, but there is little evidence that charter schools
are providing superior student outcomes as compared to public schools.9 Charitable contribution
efficiency theories ask whether the charitable contribution deduction generates more dollars for
public goods than would taxing alone.10 There is no clear efficiency to be gained here either.
Charters rely on tax dollars primarily, not charitable contributions, and public schools also have
the ability to seek charitable contributions. Perhaps charters as an institutional structure can attract
more dollars for education through the charitable contribution than the public school system. Some
anecdotal evidence supports this as a possible efficiency.11 Equity asks whether tax policy treats
one taxpayer fairly as compared to other taxpayers. Some equity theorists also argue that equity
means the tax system should redistribute money from high-income to low-income individuals.
Equity theories are not well defined, but we can say a couple things. Because both public school
and private schools are generally provided tax exemption, providing exemption to charters would
treat these activities the same way. Additionally, charters tend to serve a lower income group, so
bearing a 0% tax rate is perhaps more appropriate than a top tax rate. However, because charters
rely primarily on tax dollars they likely redistribute no more wealth than the traditional public
school they replace. As for the charitable contribution, this is a deduction that is not designed with
equity in mind. Only a small group, about nine percent of taxpayers, mostly high-income are able
to deduct such contributions.12 As discussed in Part IV(C), most accept that the charitable
contribution deduction amounts to a subsidy from the government equal to the tax rate times the
amount of the deduction. Thus, the government provides significant incentives for the charitable
activity of a very small group of citizens in our country, and little for everyone else. Though this
is not a critique focused on the support of charters generally, this does not meet the first notion of
equity. That said, generating donations from high income individuals to charters would generally
result in some redistribution; but this redistribution is no more than if they made the donation to a
public school. In other words, neither charitable tax subsidy theories of efficiency nor equity
provide substantial support for the provision of these subsidies.
A political justice analysis suggests there are problems with the state subsidizing charter
schools through the Code because this system is not supportive of a rational deliberative
democracy. By granting tax benefits to a charter school, federal tax policy provides support to an
endeavor that lowers PVE both in the shaping of the education that takes place in the school and
in a long-term sense because the non-democratic education provided to the children likely impacts
the ability of those individual to participate in a democratic endeavor into the future. A key piece
8

See Infra Part IV(C).
See Infra Part III(B).
10
See Infra Part IV(C).
11
See Infra Part V(A) p. 37.
12
Congress significantly raised the standard deduction in the 2017 Tax Act, Sec. 11021, Pub.L. 115-7 (Dec. 22,
2017). The Tax Policy Center estimates this change reduced those deducting their charitable contributions from 21%
of households to about 9% of households. https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tcja-affectincentives-charitable-giving.
9
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of the PVE case developed more in Part III is that we should prioritize a democratic form of
education at the primary and secondary levels. I mean that in at least two senses: (1) primary and
secondary education should be designed to prepare children to effectively participate in our
democratic order; and (2) the only way to fairly determine what it means to effectively participate
in our democratic order to employ democratic means. We are not born with the ability to operate
a democratic order. The virtues of toleration and “mutual respect for reasonable differences of
moral opinion,” must be taught.13 Significantly, an education not democratically shaped fails to
truly and fairly capture the democratic values the community intends to support and
simultaneously fails to teach the deep cooperation needed to build a strong sustainable democracy.
The very act of educating the young is more than preparing them to work in a capitalistic economy
– it is to collectively realize the deep cooperation that is needed to shape a democratically led
system. To the extent charter schools stand for the proposition that management organizations
should decide how to educate children instead of the local community, they fail at the most
fundamental purpose and role of primary and secondary education – preparing children to
participate in a democratic order. In turn, for reasons of the tax design, the charitable tax subsidies
also provide strong incentives to place control of school values and policy in the hands of wealthy
donors rather than the local community.
The argument from democracy might naturally lead to a conclusion that states ought not
adopt charter schools at all. Though I am sympathetic to such an argument, the political reality is
that the federal government and state and local governments have expressed support for charter
schools through democratic processes.14 Why use a political justice lens and then call for policy
that would run counter to policies chosen democratically?15 The key to answering this question
lies in the interest the community has in democratically shaped education developed in Part III.
On the strong assumption that charters are here to stay, but in light of the political justice concerns
regarding a tax policy that rewards an arrangement that lowers PVE, Congress should modify the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) to push charters to be more democratic in nature.
How might we accomplish such a goal through tax policy? Congress could require charter
schools to assess the educational needs of its community every three to five years and report on
them publicly, a similar policy to one it already imposes on charitable hospitals.16 This could
improve the democratic transparency of charters, but we would need something more to ensure a
tighter connection to democratic processes. Considering that Congress requires credit counseling
organizations to maintain independent board members,17 it could require charters to have voting
board members composed of parents, teachers, and members of the local community. This will not
cure the problem of schools delinked from a democratic process, but it would enhance the
connection to the local community voice. One significant remaining problem is that charter schools
typically do not employ unionized teachers. This makes the important voice of teachers weaker
13

Amy Gutmann, Undemocratic Education, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, 75 (ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum,
1989).
14
See Infra Part III (B). Many question whether the process was entirely democratic in nature. Some of the
wealthiest and powerful private foundation have put substantial money and effort into the effort to create charter
schools. See SARAH RECKHOW, FOLLOW THE MONEY: HOW FOUNDATION DOLLARS CHANGE PUBLIC SCHOOL
POLITICS (2013); MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM, DARK MONEY AND THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL PRIVATIZATION (2021).
15
See CUNNINGHAM, supra note __ at 44 (discussing this argument and citing to Robert Maranto, Michael Q.
McShane, & David Bowen, Race to the Top: Introducing Competition for Federal Dollars, in ROBERT MARANTO &
MICHAEL Q. MCSHANE, PRESIDENT OBAMA AND EDUCATION REFORM: THE PERSONAL AND THE POLITICAL 94
(2012)).
16
26 U.S.C. § 501(r).
17
26 U.S.C. § 501(q)(1)(D).
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than ought to be the case to best promote a democratic order. I discuss more possibilities in Part
V.
Charter schools are publicly-funded schools that are typically governed by a group or
organization under a legislative contract (or charter) with the state, district, or other entity.18 As of
January 2020, forty-five states and the District of Columbia had adopted charter school
legislation.19 Though charters today are largely delinked from a democratic process in their
operation, the history of charters suggests they do have real democratic possibilities. Albert
Shanker, identified by some as the originator of the charter idea,20 was deeply committed to
democracy in schools.21 He supported teachers unions for charter schools and believed that the
teachers should be directly involved in shaping the decisions of the school rather than receiving a
mandate from a school board.22 In effect, he wanted schools to be laboratories of democracy. Some
critics of the charter movement also see in it this potential democratization of education.23
One more bit of context is worth setting out in this Introduction. The United States
discriminated on the basis of race in its schools for a long time. Additionally, primary and
secondary schools are more segregated today than they were in the 1960s,24 and studies show that
in the South charters have increased segregation.25 Problematically, the inception of the idea of
choice in education can be traced to efforts to maintain segregation after Brown v. Board of
Education.26 In some states parents had “freedom of choice” to send their children to the public
school of their choice.27 In addition to considering tax policy regarding charters, this Article
highlights the way in which our tax system at times enhances segregation. This is at heart a problem
of democracy. It is a choice to regard some voices as lesser. Even if the charitable tax subsidies
are efficient and redistribute wealth, if they work to enhance segregation, they cause harm.28
This Article focuses on charter schools and tax policy alone. There are strong implications
for private charitable schools and tax policy as well. I discuss some of those implications, but do
not take a stance on those other matters. Private schools are different from charters in that they do
not get broad governmental support. A significant implication of the Article though is that our
18

KE WANG, AMY RATHBU, & LAUREN MUSU, SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE UNITED STATES:2019 1 (2019) [hereinafter
SCHOOL CHOICE], https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2019/2019106.pdf.
19
Education Commission of the States, Charter School Policies https://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/.
20
Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, The Original Charter School Vision, NYTIMES (Aug. 30, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/opinion/sunday/albert-shanker-the-original-charter-school-visionary.html.
Some identify Ray Budde as the creator of the charter school idea. See Michael A. Naclerio, Accountability Through
Procedure? Rethinking Charter School Accountability and Special Education Rights, 117 COL. L. REV. 1153, 1153
n. 1 (2017) (citing RAY BUDDE, EDUCATION BY CHARTER: RESTRUCTURING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 14-20 (1988).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated
Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 760 (2000).
24
GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR
NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES, A REPORT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (August 2007) [hereinafter HISTORIC
REVERSALS] https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversalsaccelerating-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf.
25
ERICA FRANKENBERG, ET. AL. SOUTHERN SCHOOLS: MORE THAN A HALF-CENTURY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION, The Civil Rights Project at UCLA 13-15 (May 23, 2017).
26
Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 568 (2001) [hereinafter
Color of Choice].
27
Color of Choice, supra note __, at 568.
28
I am expressly not taking on matters of same-sex schools, or even expressly private religious schools, and only
focusing here on the act of a public school system working in effect to separate children in primary and secondary
schools into racially segregated schools.
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theories for why we ought to exempt organizations from the income tax fail to account for the fact
that a sizable portion of the funds come from governments rather than from voluntary
contributions. In 2013, government funds accounted for one third of charitable organization
revenue.29 Our theories supporting charitable tax policy should take that fact into consideration.
Part II describes public education within the United States and the operation of charter
schools within that system. I examine political justice as a tax policy critique and its relationship
to education in Part III. Part IV reviews the requirements of operating as a charitable organization,
considers benefits of that status under federal tax law, and assesses theories for why we might
provide such benefits. I analyze these matters in Part V and conclude in Part VI.
II.

EDUCATION IN THE US & CHARTER SCHOOLS
A. Short Introduction

The notion of common public schools in the United States date back to the beginning of
our country.30 Inspired to preserve religious community,31 the Puritans enacted the first education
law in the colonies in 1642 and passed the first compulsory law in the colonies in 1647. 32 By the
1840s Horace Mann promoted a common school in order to “create citizens with the knowledge,
skills, and public spirit required to maintain a republic and to protect it from the sources of faction,
class, and self-interest that pose the primary threat to its existence.”33
There are two competing justifications for public education in America: principles of
societal shaping whether for religious or democratic purposes and principles related to social
mobility/advantage.34 In the early 1800s, the principles of democracy were particularly prevalent,
represented by thinkers like Horace Mann, and in the late 1800s, the principles of social
mobility/advantage became the primary justification.35 In the 1900s through now, arguably
democracy and social mobility rationales worked together in tandem in justification of public
education.36 Today, market-based reforms dominate and social mobility purposes seem to be the
primary vision of public education.37
In the United States, the general control of primary and secondary education lays with state
and local government.38 The federal government plays a modest role in the education system,
typically delivering funds to the states or local governments to support disadvantaged students.
The education system has traditionally used the “district” model with the local school district

29

Sarah L. Pettijohn & Elizabeth T. Boris, Nonprofit-Government Contracts and Grants: Findings from the 2013
National Survey 4 (Urban Institute 2013).
30
CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC (1983).
31
David F. Labaree, Consuming the Public School, 61 EDUC. THEORY 381, 382 (2011) [Consuming the Public].
32
DONALD PARKERSON & JO ANN PARKERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, 13 (2017) [hereinafter THE
STRUGGLE]; COMPULSORY EDUCATION, supra note __ at 11 (noting that you could interpret the 1642 law to be the
first compulsory education law).
33
Consuming the Public, supra note __ at 384.
34
David F. Labaree, Consuming the Public School, 61 EDUC. THEORY 381 (2011).
35
Erika K. Wilson, Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the Privatization of Public Education, 51 WA. U. J. L.
& POL’Y 189, 222-223 (2016).
36
Consuming the Public, supra note __ at 384-85.
37
Wilson supra note __ at 225.
38
THE STRUGGLE, supra note __.
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holding the operational responsibilities.39 This provides local control but tends to have unequal
effect on the funds available for the district schools. School districts generate most of their funds
by levying a tax on the real estate within the district. “Because no state draws its school district
boundaries to equalize the value of property within each district, different districts raise different
amounts of money for their schools.”40 State governments typically make appropriations to local
school districts in an attempt to aid property-poor districts.41 Some states are more active in trying
to remedy the natural inequality created through this local property-based system.
In tandem with the school choice movement, “[t]here have been movements to shift
various responsibilities down the chain of command from school board and superintendent to
principals and teachers.”42 This new structure, which distributes the operation responsibilities
across various public entities and sometimes private entities, typically through charter schools, has
been termed the “portfolio” model.43 Presidents G.W. Bush and Obama both promoted the
portfolio model.44 Both presidents increased federal funding to develop charter schools and in
some cases exempted states from No Child Left Behind.45 In Tennessee, for instance, the
legislature “removed the cap on charter schools and created a state-level Achievement School
District (ASD) with the power to intervene in consistently failing schools by running such schools
directly or authorizing a charter school operator to take over the school.”46 The Trump
Administration increased the appropriation of charter school funding and promoted school choice
as well.47 This movement of authority from the district to the school comes simultaneously with a
movement of greater authority to the state.48
The school choice movement, which includes vouchers, magnet schools, and charter
schools emerged after the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.49 School choice is
steeped in both modern conservative and liberal political heritage. On the conservative side, Milton
Friedman advocated for the movement based on markets, competition, and limited governmental
influence.50 Civil Rights groups brought actions against some of these conservative efforts and
targeted IRS policy to grant exemption from income tax to private schools that were formed to
avoid segregation.51 Civil rights organizations also created alternative schools for Black students
while they protested segregated schools with an aim to increase academic achievement, develop
racial pride, and bring attention to the inadequacies of the public schools.52

39

Daniel Kiel, The Endangered School District: The Promise and Challenge of Redistributing Control of Public
Education, 22 BOSTON U. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 341, 343 (2013).
40
Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public School, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1348 (2004).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 344.
44
See id. at 354.
45
Id. at 354-55.
46
Id. at 355.
47
SCHOOL CHOICE supra note _.
48
Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 857, 872 (2006)
(noting that between 1930 and 2003, state funding changed from 20% to 50% for public education).
49
Stephanie R. Logan, A Historical and Political Look at the Modern School Choice Movement, 27 INT’L J. OF
EDUC. REFORM 1, 3 (2018) [hereinafter Modern School Choice Movement].
50
Modern School Choice Movement, supra note __.
51
Joseph Crespino, Civil Rights and the Religious Right, in RIGHTWARD BOUND 90 (ed. Bruce J. Schulman & Julian
E Zelizer).
52
Modern School Choice Movement, supra note __, at 4.
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Minnesota adopted the first charter school legislation in 199153 with the intention of giving
any educator the ability to open a school.54 The federal government authorized the federal funding
of public charter schools in 1994.55 Charter schools are federally authorized to “improve the . . .
educational system and education opportunities for all people . . . by supporting innovation in
public education in public school settings.”56 This federal legislation allows significant flexibility
in the structure and funding of charter schools. That structure, discussed more below, is largely
determined by the state regulatory regime.
In the 2000-01 school year, 1,993 charter schools operated in 35 states and the District of
Columbia and served 1% of all U.S. public school students.57 By 2016-17, 7,011 charter schools
operated in 43 states58 and the District of Columbia and served 6% of all public-school students.59
The enrollment in public charter schools changed 571.4% between 2000 and 2016, from less than
half a million students to more than 3 million students.60
Demographically, during the 2016-17 school year, a higher percentage of public charter
school students than traditional public-school students were Black and Hispanic,61 and a higher
percentage of students were poor or near-poor in charter schools than traditional public schools.62
Differences exist geographically, as well. Fifty-six percent of public charter schools are located in
cities, and thirty seven percent of public charter schools are in the West (thirty three percent are in
the South, twenty percent are in the Midwest, and ten percent are in the Northeast).63
Though there are some standout charters, evidence does not show that charter schools are
more effective than public schools as a whole. A review of ninety studies in 2012 found that charter
schools students performed no better than their public-school peers.64 A review of studies in 2018
found comparable results: charter students perform no better than public school peers, but some
urban charters serving low-income students improved test scores.65 Troublingly, one study of
charters in the South finds they are increasing racial and socioeconomic segregation. 66
B. Charter School Structure

53

Laws of Minnesota 1991, chapter 265, article 9, section 3. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/1991/0/265/
Charter Schools. Minnesota Legislative Reference Library.
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides/guides?issue=charter
55
Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994
56
20 U.S.C § 7221(1)
57
SCHOOL CHOICE supra note __at 1
58
Currently, there are forty-four states. West Virginia enacted charter school legislation in 2019. Measuring Up.
59
SCHOOL CHOICE supra note __ at 2.
60
Id. at 8.
61
Id. at 16.
62
Id. at 30; see also Epple, D., Romano, R., & Zimmer, R. Charter Schools: A Survey of Research on their
Characteristics and Effectiveness (NBER Working Paper No. 21256) (2015, June).
63
Id. at 19.
64
William H. Jeynes, A Meta-Analysis on the Effects and Contributions of Public, Public Charter, and
Religious Schools on Student Outcomes, 87 PEABODY J. EDU. 305 (2012).
65
Sarah Cohodes, Charter Schools and the Achievement Gap, The Future of Children , Policy Issue: Charter
Schools and the Achievement Gap, 1, 14 (2018).
66
ERICA FRANKENBERG, ET. AL. SOUTHERN SCHOOLS: MORE THAN A HALF-CENTURY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION, The Civil Rights Project at UCLA 13-15 (May 23, 2017).
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/southern-schools-brown83-report/?searchterm=southern%20schools:%20more%20than%20a%20half.
54
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Charter schools are not subject to the same state and local laws as are public schools.67 For
instance, they need not follow the curriculum set by the local school board and can require
uniforms or not; they often need not comply with teacher certification rules, testing regimes
established for public schools, or abide by contracts with teachers’ unions. A review of 50 states
shows that states regularly waive substantial requirements that apply to regular public schools.68
California for instance waives most state laws associated with school districts.69 New York states
that charters must comply with health and safety, civil rights, and student assessment, but that
other public school laws generally do not apply. 70 Pennsylvania acts similarly.71 Texas gives
charters a general waiver but then imposes a variety of similar requirements relating to health and
safety, accountability, bilingual education, public education information management system,
prekindergarten programs, and criminal history records.72 New Jersey allows a charter to request
a waiver from all school laws except those regulating assessment, testing, civil rights, student
health and safety, and students with disabilities.73
There are three main components of the charter school structure: (1) the legislative or
regulatory government authorizer, (2) an organization to hold and operate the charter (which is
typically a nonprofit managed by a governing board/developer), and (3) the management company
(called Education Management Organizations (EMO)74 or Charter Management Organization
(CMO)). The focus of this Article is primarily on the charter itself, but it also considers the
management organizations in part.
States employ a dizzying array of authorizers: higher education institutions (HEI),
independent chartering boards (ICB), local education agencies (LEA), non-educational
government entities (NEG), nonprofit organizations (NPO), and state education agencies
(SEA).75 In Texas, there are five types of charter schools and different authorities can approve
the different types. Independent school districts, i.e., school boards or LEAs, authorize and
oversee campus and campus program charters.76 Most charters in Texas are open-enrollment
ones approved by the commissioner of education.77 California primarily relies upon LEAs to

67

Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The
Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 765 (2000) [hereinafter Toward a Pragmatic]; see also Kathleen
Conn, For Profit School Management Corporations: Serving the Wrong Master, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 140-41
(2002) (noting that charter schools often need not comply with special education needs, school lunches, or
bargaining with union teachers).
68
https://reports.ecs.org/comparisons/charter-school-policies-14
69
Cal. Educ. Code § 47610; Cal. Educ. Code § 47611; Cal. Educ. Code § 41365.
70
N.Y. Educ. Law § 2854.
71
24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-1715-A; 17-1732-A.
72
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.012; Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.013; Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.055; Tex. Educ.
Code Ann. § 12.056; Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.103; Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.104; Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §
12.156
73
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11.
74
The No Child Left Behind Act encourages the use of EMOs in education. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20
U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq. (2002).
75
National Association of Charter School Authorizers, Charter School Authorizers Across the Country.
https://www.qualitycharters.org/authorizer-types/. See also Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. Kuboyama,
Approving Charter Schools: The Gatekeeper Function, 53 ADMIN L. REV. 869, 880 (2001) [hereinafter Approving
Charter Schools].
76
Id.
77
Id.
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make charter decisions,78 but county offices of education and the State Board of Education can
issue them as well.79 The New Jersey Commissioner of Education has the power to authorize
charter schools, which then operate independently of the local board of education.80 In New
York, charter authorizing entities include: the school district’s board of education (or the
chancellor of city school district with more than one million residents), the board of trustees of
the state university of New York, or the board of regents.81
Who can form a charter? Many states require charters to be organized as a non-profit entity
or utilize a non-profit board. Five states allow granting charters directly to for-profit EMOs.82 In
Texas, an eligible open-enrollment charter school applicant includes (1) an institution of higher
education, (2) a private or independent institution of higher education, (3) a 501(c)(3) entity, or (4)
a government entity.83 California does not prohibit “any private person or organization from
providing funding or other assistance to the establishment or operation of a charter school.”84 After
July 1, 2019 a California charter may not operate as a for profit corporation.85 California requires
charter boards to include a chartering authority member as a representative on the board of
directors.86 in New Jersey, teachers and/or parents in the school district, an institution of higher
learning, or a private entity are allowed to form charters.87 In New York, entities eligible to submit
an application for a charter include teachers, parents, school administrators, community residents
or a combination of such.88
What about management organizations? EMOs are typically for-profit entities while
CMOs are typically nonprofit. In thirty-five states and the District of Columbia, the law allows
for-profit corporations to manage a charter, though the charter itself must be a nonprofit entity.89
EMOs generally receive per-pupil funding similar to a school district and are able to make a profit
by running the school efficiently.90 Texas regulations provide that a charter management company
can be “[a] natural person or a corporation, partnership, sole proprietor, association, agency, or
other legal entity that provides services to a charter holder or charter school.”91 As noted, after
July 1, 2019 prohibits for profit corporations or a for profit management company from operating
a charter.92 New York too prohibits for profit companies from managing charter schools. 93 Even
78

CA EDUC § 47605; some saw the California effort as problematic as sometimes an LEA might authorize a
charter far from its territory; see Approving Charter Schools, supra note __ at 884.
79
CA EDUC § 47605.5; see also Kirsten Slungaard Mumma & Martin R. West, Charter School Authorizing in
California 4 (2018) https://gettingdowntofacts.com/sites/default/files/2018-09/GDTFII_Report_West.pdf.
80
NJ ST 18A:36A-3a.
81
NY EDUC § 2851(3).
82
Anne E. Trotter, Suzanne E. Eckes, & Jonathan A. Plucker, Education Management Organizations and Charter
Schools. 213 WELR 935, 937 (2006).
83
TX EDUC § 12.101(a).
84
CA EDUC § 47603.
85
CA EDUC § 47604(b).
86
CA EDUC § 47604(c).
87
NJ ST 18A:36A-4.
88
NY EDUC § 2851(1).
89
Serving All Students, supra note __, Table 1 for states with different for-profit EMO relationships.
90
Id. at 942.
91
19 TX ADC § 100.1001.
92
CA EDUC § 47604(b).
93
NY EDUC § 2851(1); however, New York allowed charters utilizing for profit EMOs before the change in the
law in 2010 to continue to use them. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOL CENTER, THE PROFIT MYTH:
UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE OF NEW YORK CHARTER SCHOOLS 6 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.nyccharterschools.org/sites/default/files/resources/charter_school_profit_myth.pdf.
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in states where for profit management companies are prohibited, it is possible that the school could
be contracting with management companies for things like payroll.94
Though the charter school itself is the locus of the Article, much of the litigation and
critique of charter schools lies in the use of management organizations. In Pennsylvania, for
instance, litigants have challenged nonprofit charters that give up too much power to for-profit
management companies.95 In one case, the litigants successfully attacked the charter as operated
for the for profit management company rather than the public; this was because the charter board
was controlled by the same individual who controlled the for profit management company.96
Critics argue that for-profit EMOs are focused primarily on their fiduciary duty to shareholders to
generate profits,97 and are able to expand profits by expanding rapidly and standardizing the
curriculum.98 An evaluation of Michigan charters noted “[s]ome fear that in order to reduce costs,
EMOs may encourage charter schools to overlook students who are most expensive to educate,
such as those receiving special educational services or those with serious emotional or behavioral
problems.”99
Investigations have turned up conflicts of interest and related party relationships between
the EMO/CMO and charter boards.100 Renaissance Charter successfully sued its EMO Imagine
Schools for breaches of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in lease transactions. The EMO had
Renaissance enter into leases without disclosing that it would be on the other side of the
transaction.101 The Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School similarly was found to have engaged in
significant self-dealing.102 In a 2016 audit of charter management organizations, the US
Department of Education found wide risk associated with Department objectives because of weak
charter school controls.103 There is particular concern about when the CMO is for profit.104 In all

94

Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter Schools: The Success of Charter Schools Depends on Stronger
Nonprofit Board Oversight to Preserve Independence and Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management
Companies, 2011 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 8 (2011).
95
Fiona Greaves & Preston Green, The legal Issues Surrounding Partnerships between Charter Schools and ForProfit Management Companies, 206 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 27, 28-29 (2006) (citing West Chester Area Sch. Dist. v.
Collegium Charter School, 812 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 2002); Brackbill v. Ron Brown Charter Sch., 777 A.2d 131 (Pa.
Comm. Ct. 2001).
96
Butler Area School Dist. v. Einstein Acad., No. E.Q.No. 2001–50031 (Pa. Com. Pl. Sep. 10, 2001).
97
Kathleen Conn, For Profit School Management Corporations: Serving the Wrong Master, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 129
(2002).
98
Serving All Students, supra note __, at 942-943.
99
Id. at 944.
100
Id.
101
Renaissance Academy for Math and Science of Missouri, Inc., v. Imagine Schools, Inc., 2014 WL 7267033
(W.D. Missouri 2014).
102
PA. DEP'T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT: PENNSYLVANIA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL (2016),
http://www.paauditor.gov/Media/Default/Reports/PACyberCharterSchool,%20Beaver,%20092116.pdf.
103
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., ED-OIG/ A02M0012, Nationwide Assessment of Charter and
Education Management Organizations (2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2016/a02m0012.pdf.
104
Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control, and Charter Schools: The Success of Charter Schools Depends on Stronger
Nonprofit Board Oversight to Preserve Independence and Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management
Companies, 2011 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1 (2011); John Morley, For Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An
Agency Costs Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782 (2006); cf. R. David Walk, How Educational Management Companies
Serve Charter Schools and their Students, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 241 (April 2003).
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cases, it appears that contracts with an EMO or CMO present real challenges to boards to make
sure the charters interests are sufficiently protected.105
III.

POLITICAL JUSTICE AND EDUCATION

There are two central claims of this case for democracy as political justice in assessing tax
policy and education: (1) primary and secondary education should build citizens who understand
how to shape their collective lives democratically, and (2) the best way to accomplish this goal is
for primary and secondary education to be determined in a democratic manner. The strongest
democratic system is one with “free and unconstrained deliberation of all about matters of common
concern,”106 and the primary and secondary education system is central to building that capacity.
The first section sets out why we should take political justice into consideration in assessing tax
policy and discusses what I mean by political justice. Because proponents of charters make a
number of political justice arguments, the next part considers those contentions. The final section
lays out the democratic case for primary and secondary education.
A. Why Political Justice as Democracy in Tax Policy?
In addition to the traditional tax policy factors of efficiency and equity, we ought to
consider political justice as we design a tax system.107 By efficiency I mean tax policy critiques
that attempt to maximize the amount of value created in a political system. That typically means
tax policy that does the least harm to what would occur in a “free market” or replicates better what
a perfect “free market” might accomplish. By equity, I mean critiques that consider who should
bear a particular tax and by how much as compared to other individuals within the society. It also
involves questions of redistribution of wealth. By political justice I mean a system that best
respects the political voice of each individual in society in collectively shaping our social world.
The ideal model is pure democracy where each member of the community has an opportunity to
develop the agenda, discuss the agenda, and have final say on matters on the agenda of a relevant
community. This is not a model that is in opposition to majority rule. The key is that in making
those majoritarian decisions each member of the relevant community is permitted a real
opportunity to participate in the entirety of that process.
I presume a democratic system as opposed to the two primary competing systems, anarchy,
and guardianship, to be the most just political system.108 Additionally, I draw primarily from
deliberative democratic traditions in making my case for the details of a just democratic system
because the deliberative approach tries to move us closer to the ideal democratic state. 109 I
105

Fiona Greaves & Preston Green, The legal Issues Surrounding Partnerships between Charter Schools and ForProfit Management Companies, 206 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 27, 36-36 (2006).
106
Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 120
(Seyla Behabib ed., 1996).
107
Political Justice, supra note __.
108
I discussed why we ought to prefer democracy to anarchy or guardianship in a prior article. Philip Hackney, Prop
Up the Heavenly Chorus? Labor Unions, Tax Exemption and Political Voice Equality, 91 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 315
(2017) [hereinafter Prop Up]. Additionally, I have made the case for what some models of democracy such as
republican, liberal, and deliberative might demand in the evaluation of social welfare organizations as exempt from
income tax. Political Justice, supra note __.
109
Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 68
(Seyla Behabib ed., 1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004);
JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (trans. William Rehg, 1986) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS]. I am
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acknowledge the importance of liberal and republican approaches to democracy within the United
States and believe we should consider those traditions in assessing political justice.110
Democracy demands more than a right to vote for a representative. The idea of governance
by the people springs from the notion that each of us is equal and has the right to shape our own
world, which Dahl refers to as “intrinsic equality”.111 A “person’s right to participate in the
shaping of the world she shares in common with others, which characterizes a well-functioning
democracy, is grounded in her fundamental interests as a member of political society.”112 This
“intrinsic equality” leads to basic principles that each member of a relevant group who has attained
a certain age suggesting competency,113 ought to have the right to set the agenda of the group,
develop information and express their voice regarding matters before the group, and vote on any
final decisions before the group.114 It demands a broad inclusion and equality of voice, or PVE, in
collective decision making. Only those who have reached a certain age have these broad
democratic rights. This recognition of age suggesting competency also highlights the reality that
there is a period where children must learn to be a citizen before they become entitled to shape
their lives in common with other citizens. Though ideal democracy is impossible, we have basic
principles of a democratic order: frequent fair elections of individuals to represent the people, the
right of all people of a certain competency to vote, and the basic liberal rights of freedom of speech,
press, association, religion.
There are many models of democracy.115 For ease of analysis though it is easiest to think
of three primary ones: republican, liberal, and deliberative.116 At the core of republican theory is a
belief that it is possible to determine a general will that is representative of the interests of all
members of the relevant community. Society is then ordered in a harmonious way at the level of
the state in furtherance of that general will.117 This leaves a lot of power to the state and accords
fairly well with what I have described above as the family state. Modern republican theory,
anchored in a Madisonian vision of factions and a concern that a state might be overwhelmed by
narrow interests of a minority or even majority, focus on the protection of various groups such as
religious ones.118 The liberal view on the other hand prioritizes the individual and views politics
through a market mechanism.119 The state is a neutral arbiter of interests as those interests within
the state fight for the right to direct policy. State of families and state of individuals theories fit
fairly well within this liberal democracy.
The deliberative approach is a melding of the two. Deliberative democracy emphasizes the
importance of public conversations in shaping policy. It holds that “regulated communication
processes can create the necessary conditions for inclusive decision making.”120 Deliberative
also influenced in part by critiques of deliberative democracy to make it a more inclusive system. See, e.g., Iris
Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE
68 (Seyla Behabib ed., 1996).
110
See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1 (1994).
111
ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 85 (1989) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS].
112
THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY 12 (2008).
113
See DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note __ at 115.
114
See DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note __ at 109-114.
115
DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (Third Ed. 2006).
116
For a discussion of these ideas see Political Justice, supra note __.
117
See Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER 239 (Ciaran
Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998) [hereinafter Three Normative].
118
See Political Justice, supra note __.
119
Three Normative, supra note __.
120
Edda Sant, Democratic Education: A Theoretical Review (2006-2017), 89 REV. EDUC. RES. 655, 668 (2019).

14

DRAFT 9/25/22

Public Good Through Charters

democratic theorists argue we should establish processes that allow citizens to give one another
their reasons for adopting a certain action such that all will understand the reasons for any adopted
binding decision. Some theorists define it as “a form of government in which free and equal
citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another
reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions
that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.”121 Legitimacy of
law and state authority is based in popular sovereignty and procedures that allow each citizen to
be treated as free and equal members entitled to collectively shape their community. 122
Though tax may seem far from democracy, it impacts the democratic balance of our society
through its very establishment, the base chosen, the progressive nature of that system,123 and even
through its substantive provisions.124 It effects political justice through its implementation because
of the conscious collective choice to allocate a certain amount of economic production collected
from individuals to carry out collectively chosen goals. The amount and choice of base have
impacts on how much collective activity we might collectively engage in, and who is going to be
impacted and by how much in that collective choice. When a substantive provision of the Code
directly impacts the balance of how and who chooses any collective activity by either taxing or
not taxing that activity political justice is impacted.
Income tax exemption for nonprofit organizations has a direct impact on democratic
operation in the United States. This is clearest in the case of tax-exempt groups that are interest
groups such as labor unions and business leagues.125 Because these organizations carry out selfish
activity on behalf of members, tax exemption arguably provides a subsidy in those cases equal to
the current corporate tax rate times the earnings of a particular exempt entity. 126 That subsidy in
turn supports those interest groups that exist and are best able to maximize the benefit. Because of
the challenge of collective action that subsidy likely flows in greater amounts to smaller wealthier
interests who find it much easier to organize and thereby access that tax subsidy. 127 This means
the policy of exemption puts a finger on the scale for the political voice of those interests best able
to make use of the subsidy.128 Is this good tax policy? It is unlikely that it is efficient or equitable
to further wealthy groups that would have organized anyway. A political justice critique also finds

121

AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
AND D ISAGREEMENT].
122
BETWEEN FACTS, supra note __ at 110-11.

7 (1996) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY

123

See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1129, 1131 (2008).
124
Political Justice, supra note __.
125
For a discussion of interest groups and their relationship to tax exempt groups, see Philip Hackney, Taxing the
Unheavenly Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6) Trade Associations are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DEN. U. L.
REV. 265 (2015) [hereinafter Taxing the Unheavenly].
126
Many question whether tax exemption for nonprofits is a subsidy. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation
in its Tax Expenditure Budget only includes exemption as an expenditure when there is “a direct business analogue
or compete with for-profit organizations organized for similar purposes.” See JCT, Estimates of Federal Tax
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2020-2024, JCX 23-20, 9 (November 20, 2021). See also Daniel Halperin, Income
Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 Tax L. Rev. 133 (2006) [hereinafter Mutual Nonprofits] (concluding that
exemption for mutual benefits like business leagues amounts to not much of a subsidy other than on capital assets
and investment income because most of the expenditures would be deductible in any case). The ability to transfer
appreciated assets to these entities without the imposition of an income tax or a gift tax provides other ways of
providing a subsidy to the members of these organizations.
127
I discuss these implications of collective action theory in Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note __.
128
Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note __.
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problem with designing a tax system that unequally aids parties in their efforts to influence the
polity.
The goal in this Article is to examine the impact providing charitable tax subsidies to
charter schools has on political justice. The next two sections consider the political justice and
other arguments made by charter proponents and then what political justice demands in the shaping
and delivery of primary and secondary education.
B. Arguments from Choice
School choice promoters argue that the district public-school model is a monopoly that
fails the United States in preparing students for the workforce.129 Charter supporters find homes in
a range of theoretic traditions, but typically are organized into those who argue for what they call
‘choice,’ which I will use as shorthand for charter supporters.130 They generally either argue that
a parent has a fundamental right to decide how their children should be educated, or that the current
government-run primary and secondary education system is not efficient.
Some choice proponents believe that parents have a fundamental right to decide
educational matters for their children. Thus, a state has no right to determine how a parent’s child
should be educated, only the parent can make that decision. This theorist typically accepts that the
state has the right to mandate education but argues that parents have the right to determine what
that education should look like and who should provide that education. These parent-focused
choice proponents argue this strengthens the connection of parents to their children’s education,
and that the ability to choose has a real value in a liberal society. 131 Furthermore, they argue, the
common understanding of public schools as places to impart important political values to children
has failed, but furthermore that political institutions, not schools, are where our children should
derive political values.132
Michael McConnell exemplifies these theorists. He argues for liberal democratic education
where the state publicly supports a wide-range of schooling systems rather than the typical public
school district managing the delivery of all public education.133 He suggests that in a pluralistic
society where we require everyone to either educate their children through a public school or pay
the costs, we should expect less toleration rather than more because of the anger that this situation
creates for the out-parents.134 He fears that those whose views do not prevail in determining
“democratic values” will be treated as “second class citizens”.135 McConnell’s contends that our
imperfectly democratic culture is not able to consciously socially reproduce a legitimate
democratic culture.
Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education Enter the “Adapt or
Die” Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 79 (1995).
130
School choice includes a number of different models of delivery of education. There are vouchers that might be
provided by a nonprofit entity or by a state or governmental entity that can be used to attend either public schools or
private schools. There are various ranges of different options within public schools themselves such as magnet
schools that focus on certain themes such as the arts or engineering. Finally, there are charter schools. See, e.g.,
BRIGHOUSE, supra note __, at 20-21.
131
James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If, 35 B.C. L. REV. 619 (1994) [hereinafter When, Not If].
132
When, Not If, supra note __, at 624.
133
Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values are Ill-Served By Democratic
Control of Schooling, 43 Moral & Pol. Edu. 87, 88 (2002) [hereinafter Education Disestablishment].
134
See Education Disestablishment, supra note __ at 98.
135
See Education Disestablishment, supra note __ at 102.
129
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Some choice theorists approach the question instrumentally. Under this approach, public
schools are inefficient. They argue that market mechanisms will bring down school costs and raise
the quality of education.136 They posit that teachers unions harm the efficiency of the delivery of
education; these theorists hope that choice might help eliminate teachers’ unions.137 Some
proponents argue that if we lower the cost and get the same results, we free up resources for other
equality-related matters like health care. To these theorists, choice creates a greater diversity of
options for education. Such diversity will allow the school system to fit the needs of children more
precisely.
Milton Friedman is a good representative of these choice theorists. To Friedman, the state’s
obligation to provide education lies in “neighborhood effects.”138 He notes that: “[a] stable and
democratic society is impossible without widespread acceptance of some common set of values
and without a minimum degree of literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens."139 Thus,
Friedman generally accepts the democratic importance of education for primary and secondary
education. Though he recognizes the importance of schools teaching common values, his solution
is to allow private schools but to provide vouchers to those schools that meet certain minimum
requirements established nationally or by a state.140 Others such as Chubb and Moe have also
argued for a market approach to public schooling.141 They argue that the traditional district system
led to centralized control by an unauthorized elite.142 To them, the very act of seeking government
solutions to school control necessarily leads to a sclerotic bureaucracy.143
If you prioritize a democratic form of education though, none of these arguments for choice
provide a system that will support a rational deliberative democracy. They all put the ability to
control the choice of how to educate the children of a community in a smaller group of hands than
the larger community. What is the democratic case?
C. Democracy and Education
Does a democratic state need to provide education? If it needs to provide education, who
should have the authority to determine what that education should look like? Finally, how do we
figure out where that authority lies in the federal system of the United States? The first question is
fairly straightforward with a lot of agreement while the latter questions are complex with
significant disagreement. It is impossible in this Article to do justice to these questions; I sketch
some answers here.
On the first question, in addition to freedom of speech, association, and religion, a fair
democratic process demands the state ensure some level of education to all individuals, particularly

See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS & AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990) [hereinafter
POLITICS, MARKETS].
137
Leo Casey, The Charter School Challenge, 24 NEW LABOR FORUM 22, 23 (2015) (pointing out that the change to
the New Orleans school system making it almost all charter schools “has become significantly younger and whiter,
supplanting the predominantly African-American and unionized teaching cohort that was illegally dismissed en
masse in the wake of the hurricane”).
138
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85 (2002 Fortieth Anniversary Ed.).
139
Id. at 86.
140
Id. at 89.
141
POLITICS, MARKETS supra note __, at 35-38.
142
POLITICS, MARKETS, supra note __.
143
POLITICS, MARKETS, supra note __, at 41-45.
136
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those who are children.144 Why should this be true? At an elemental level, in order for citizens to
participate in our democratic governing process, some basic level of education is necessary.
“[S]chools are the nurseries that enable democracy to persist.”145 Empirical evidence demonstrates
a strong correlation between a more educated society and democracy. 146 Obviously the United
States mandates education for primary and secondary school levels suggesting that it has a norm
that the state ought to provide this education.147 The Supreme Court also recognizes the importance
of schools in shaping the democratic character of U.S. citizens.148
Most see primary and secondary education as a public good or at least a quasi-public good
and believe this supports the case that the state should ensure this education is broadly provided.149
Education can also be thought of as an impure public good with secondary benefits.150 Though
there are complex definitions,151 by a public good I mean one in which “one person's consumption
of the good does not reduce its availability to others (i.e., the good is nonrival or in joint supply);
and no one can be excluded from the good (i.e., the good is nonexclusive).”152 Because of the
significant problem of free riders associated with public goods, most accept the idea that public
goods are things that ought generally be provided by the state.153 Furthermore, people are not born
with the ability to engage in deliberation; it is incumbent upon a state interested in democratic selfpreservation to teach these skills.154 However, complicating the case, is the fact that education
provides other skills too such as how to live the good life155 and how to become gainfully
employed.156
Not everyone bases the obligation of the state to provide education on the fact that it is in
part a public good. Brighouse, for instance, argues the state must provide education “to deliver on
obligations that all adults in a society have to each of the children in that society.” 157 Rather than
144

See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 28 (1980); THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE
OF THE MANY 295 n.1 (1996); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 46 (1999) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION]; DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note __ at 31; Orit Ichilov, Privatization and
Commercialization of Public Education: Consequences for Citizenship and Citizenship Education, 44 URBAN REV.
281, 284 (2012) [hereinafter Privatization and Commercialization].
145
Privatization and Commercialization, supra note __ at 283.
146
Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Andrei Schliefer, Why does Democracy need Education?, 12 J.
ECON. GROWTH 77, 79 (2007).
147
See MICHAEL S. KATZ, A HISTORY OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION LAWS (1976) [hereinafter COMPULSORY
EDUCATION] (describing the long history of compulsory education laws in the United State dating back to as early as
the Massachusetts Bay Colony).
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Ambach v. Norwick, 401 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
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Privatization and Commercialization, supra note __, at 284.
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See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (1988)
(citing Lancaster, The Pure Theory of Impure Public Goods, in PUBLIC AND URBAN ECONOMICS 127 (R. Grieson ed.
1976)).
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HARRY BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE & SOCIAL JUSTICE 41 (2000) (definitions may include jointness in supply,
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each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of
that good”).
153
Still, from an optimal economic standpoint it is hard to determine the correct amount of expenditure for that
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education being a public good, the state must provide it because everyone has a moral obligation
to provide the private right of each child to education.158 This argument shows the problem with
the claim from the choice perspective that parents have the sole right to determine how their
children are educated. The parents are not the only people who have a legitimate and important
interest in the education of their children. The community also has a significant interest in that
endeavor.
The next question – who should be authorized to determine what education should look
like – is more controversial. Aristotle suggested a simple general guide to what education should
look like: “[t]he citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he lives.”159
Most approaches to education can be seen through that lens. Gutmann provides a useful way of
evaluating classic answers to this question through this lens. She describes three iconic education
theory families describing normative approaches to education policy from the perspective of a
government: the family state, the state of families, and the state of individuals.160 She compares
these with a democratic state of education.
A family state theorist believes it is possible to determine what justice and virtue are and
then to impart that through education in order to build a harmonious society. 161 Plato most
forcefully put this theory of education forward.162 The family state holds that “[c]itizens of a wellordered family state learn that they cannot realize their own good except by contributing to the
social good, and they are educated to desire only what is good for themselves and their society.”163
The authority for determining educational policy rests with the state in this theory. Anyone who
comes from a pure family state perspective is unlikely to support choice as it is incumbent upon
the state through whatever process it uses to determine policy to choose what will be taught in
primary and secondary education.
The state of families theorist believes parents know best how to educate their child.
Gutmann suggests John Locke can be most clearly identified with this notion.164 Locke believed
parents were the best protectors of children’s interests.165 There is a sense that parents have a
natural right or some conventional right to direct the education of their own children. 166 Thus,
authority over education remains in the hands of parents in this theory. Proponents who argue for
choice from the perspective of the right of a parent to control their child’s education find a
normative home in the state of families.
The state of individuals finds its home in liberal democracy and the thought of John Stuart
Mill. It starts with a critique of the state of families, namely that children are not the property of
their parents.167 The fundamental principle of this state is to not bias individuals toward any one
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path; students, should be allowed to choose their own path.168 In this theory, authority for
determining content is placed in the hands of those who can create a system that will not bias
children in any direction. Instrumental choice theorists find their normative home in the state of
individuals.
Gutmann proposes a democratic state of education as superior to the other three.169 In this
deliberative democratic approach to education “democracy is not confined to the sphere of political
decision making, but extends to participation in the ‘construction, maintenance and transformation
of all forms of social and political life.”170 Or as Dewey says “democracy is more than a form of
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.”171
This case is thus most deeply connected to a democratic tradition. In determining what education
should look like, the authority for determining education in this system depends upon a fair
democratic procedure. How do you best include the voices of the communities who have an interest
in the shaping of the relevant primary and secondary education system?
Key to the case for the democratic state is that our primary and secondary education should
cultivate character including moral character.172 To become a part of our democratic order,
students ought to be taught to participate in the sharing of responsibility for shaping who we are,
i.e., conscious social reproduction.173 “As citizens, we aspire to a set of educational practices and
authorities of which the following can be said: these are the practices and authorities to which we
acting collectively as a society, have consciously agreed.”174 This collective approach to the
shaping of education necessarily rejects the three theoretical answers given above. The family state
would place the authority in a centralized government with people who understand what the good
life looks like.175 In today’s pluralistic world, the idea that a centralized state could specifically
determine the good life that benefits the entirety of the community is strained. The state of families
would determine that parents decide for their children.176 Though this might recognize some
pluralistic value, it fails to recognize that children do not belong only to the community of their
family but also the state. The state of individuals would take a position of scrupulous neutrality so
children are not biased against any particular position, i.e., it would provide no particular moral
compass.177 The problem with this liberal approach is it prioritizes some matters by default, such
as the language through which the teaching takes place, but more fundamentally it ultimately
propounds freedom of choice as the most important value and that is a value in itself that the
individual state is claiming is ultimate over any other virtue. Each of these fails necessarily because
these approaches do not allow people in the community who have a right to a role in shaping their
own life to shape education, and this is a critical piece of a democratic order.
168
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This still does not answer a significant question which is determining which community
should control which decisions. With a federal government, state government, and multiple local
jurisdictions, picking the right place is difficult. A deliberative democratic approach would
recommend that there be substantial local control. Such a choice allows more voice rather than
less in how policy is set. Indeed, if a major focus of primary and secondary education is teaching
conscious social reproduction, then real involvement at the local level is important and a significant
feature. That said, there are legitimate national and state democratic interests in determining school
policy. Ideally federal and state level governments could help set larger common culture matters
and also help ensure principles like non-discrimination and non-domination are maintained in
order to help foster an inclusive democratic culture.178
A conundrum for the democratic educational theorist is that though educational policy
ought to be set by a democratic process, the majority who sets that policy ought not “control the
content of classroom teaching so as to repress reasonable challenges to dominant political
perspectives.”179 Gutmann suggests we allow teachers and teacher unions to play a role in
establishing normal boundaries for the students so as not to have a domination of the mind of the
student by whatever majority is currently in control of the democratic state.180 Gutmann argues
that in order to build a democratic theory of education it will be necessary for parents and the state
to cede authority to professional educators to ensure a principle of nonrepression.181
“Nonrepression is therefore compatible with the use of education to inculcate those character traits,
such as honesty, religious toleration, and mutual respect for persons, that serve as foundations for
rational deliberation of differing ways of life.”182 Additionally, nondiscrimination in the operation
of education is key to democratic education – no student can be excluded from the education
system based on illegitimate grounds.
What does the democratic school itself look like? Should we allow democracy to be a part
of the school itself? Such a school might be like Dewey conceived: “a miniature community, an
embryonic society. . .. The aim is not economic value of the products, but the development of
social power and insight.”183 Dewey saw education as critical to creating and maintaining a healthy
democracy. “[D]emocracy is not confined to the sphere of political decision-making but extends
to participation in the ‘construction, maintenance, and transformation’ of all forms of social and
political life.”184 The school itself would obviously need discipline of some sort, but there needs
to be a balance between that discipline and the opportunity for the students to learn to become a
part of our participatory political system and learn to engage in conscious social reproduction. In
its own way, while schools need not tell students what the good life is, they need to learn the basics
of a democratic order, which begins with respect for all individuals no matter race, gender, sexual
orientation, and an openness to hearing other views.185 These are moral choices, and they are key
to making a democratic order work.
178
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IV.

TAX EXEMPTION, EDUCATION, BENEFITS, THEORY

The United States has long provided governmental benefits associated with activities our
society considers charitable.186 Congress exempted charitable organizations from the income tax
and included education as a favored purpose in the early versions of our income tax.187 In 1917,
Congress allowed donors to charitable organizations to deduct charitable contributions from the
income tax.188 Section 501(c)(3) of the Code opens the door to such benefits today; it describes
corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes,
provided no part of the organization’s net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual.189 A charitable organization must additionally serve a public purpose and cannot
operate contrary to public policy.190 An organization is operated exclusively for one or more
exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such
exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).191 In our common law heritage, the promotion of
education has long been recognized as a charitable purpose under charitable trust law.192 The IRS
and Treasury tell us that education in section 501(c)(3) is used in its normal common law charitable
trust sense.193 This Part IV examines the requirements for qualifying as a charitable educational
organization, the tax benefits of that status, and the theories propounded to support providing these
benefits through the Code.
A. Education as a Charitable Purpose
Treasury regulations describe two primary types of educational organizations: (1) those
that instruct “the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities,” and (2)
those that instruct “the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the
community.”194 This Article focuses on the first and not the latter (and long more controversial)195
second organization.196 Examples of organizations that further education include primary,
secondary, college, or professional trade school with regular faculty, curriculum, and student body;
186
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an organization that presents public discussions, panels, lectures, or similar programs (can include
television or radio); an organization who presents course of instruction through television or radio;
or a museum, zoo, planetarium, symphony, or other similar organization.197 For purposes of this
article, only the non-controversial primary and secondary education is at issue.
There are some limits to the bounds of education. Conducting dog training classes is not
tax exempt, nor is providing administrative services to home schooling parents.198 An organization
that primarily conducts a commercial enterprise but engages in educational activities for about ten
percent of its time does not qualify.199 Still, the general purpose is broad.
Some call education an inherently charitable purpose.200 This means that an organization
that promotes education typically need not show that it provides services for free or at low cost to
individuals who might not be able to afford the services. There is no “charity care” requirement
for education.201 The acts that could cause an educational organization to not qualify for exemption
are allowing its earnings to inure to those who control the organization, operating for the private
benefit of some party, or violating public policy.202
How do these ideas play in the charter school context? The IRS mostly finds that nonprofit
charter schools meet the basic requirements of section 501(c)(3). These are nonprofit organizations
engaged in education and thus generally inherently charitable. Indeed, the IRS Chief Counsel
argued that a nonprofit charter management organization itself met the requirements of section
501(c)(3) citing to the inherently educational nature of the activity.203 The IRS was worried that
the organization might be too commercial by focusing on providing services for a fee like a forprofit organization.204
The IRS most typically denies or revokes the exemption of a charter school when it finds
the charter was established to profit those who control the school. It often will allege that the
charter was operated for too much private benefit. An organization is not organized or operated
exclusively for exempt purposes unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.205 “Private
benefit within the scope of the prohibition may include an advantage, profit, fruit, privilege, gain,
or interest.”206 In IRS training materials on private benefit, the IRS finds a charter school managed
by an EMO to not qualify for exemption because the people who control the charter also control
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the EMO and provide strongly EMO beneficial contract terms.207 In Rameses School of San
Antonio, Texas v. Commissioner, the Service revoked a charter school’s status based on private
benefit and inurement.208 The founder and CEO of the charter was able to adjust the budgets
without any oversight from the board, her compensation was in excess of the board approved
salary, there was nonexistent support of expenditures to her, and the school leased property from
the founder.209 Such revocations or denials are rare.
Charter schools involve complex entity relationships such as a for profit management
company operating the nonprofit school. Though such arrangements could implicate
impermissible inurement, the IRS has long been accepted that “a parent corporation and its
subsidiary are separate taxable entities so long as the purposes for which the subsidiary is
incorporated are the equivalent of business activities or the subsidiary subsequently carries on
business activities.”210 This separate entity relationship generally holds in the tax exempt world as
well.211 This means the IRS will disregard the corporate entity when the “corporation or transaction
involved was a sham or fraud without any valid business purpose, or a finding of a true agency or
trust relationship between the entities.”212 This is “an evidentiary burden that is not easily
overcome.”213
However, when two entities, one nonprofit and one for-profit, join to engage in a common
enterprise the IRS will look at that relationship more closely. Typically, these joint ventures are
considered partnerships for purposes of the tax law.214 This means that the activity of the joint
venture is assumed to be the same as that of the nonprofit.215 There are generally two questions
there: (1) Is the exempt status of the charity negatively impacted in some way, and (2) does the
activity trigger the unrelated business income tax?216 The unrelated business income tax imposes
tax on the income from a trade or business that is not substantially related to a charities exempt
purpose.217 The IRS and courts have found that under certain circumstances, the activity will
neither harm the nonprofit’s charitable status, nor generate unrelated business taxable income.218
For instance, the IRS found no problems with a charitable university entering into a joint venture
with a for-profit entity to form an LLC to create video trainings for teachers.219 Each party held a
fifty percent interest in the LLC, and each party was allowed to appoint three board members.
Significantly to the IRS, the university exclusively controlled the educational material while the
207
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nonexempt organization controlled where the trainings took place. This ruling described what is
often referred to as an ancillary joint venture. This means a charity enters into a side relationship
with a for profit to carry on some small (or ancillary) part of its operation.
Sometimes though a nonprofit puts its entire operation into a joint venture. When a hospital
enters such a transaction, this is referred to as a whole hospital joint venture.220 The IRS has
approved of a nonprofit hospital putting all of its assets into a joint venture and operating a hospital
with a for profit partner.221 The IRS found that this neither ended the charitable status of the
nonprofit, nor generated unrelated business taxable income. It found that as long as “1)
participation in the partnership furthers a charitable purpose, and 2) the partnership arrangement
permits the exempt organization to act exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purpose and only
incidentally for the benefit of the for-profit partners,” that the nonprofit would continue to meet its
obligations as a charitable organization under the Code.222 Where the nonprofit cedes effective
control of the charitable activity, courts have found the nonprofit does not maintain its exempt
status.223
One more legal concept is useful to understand the tax law benefits associated with the
charter school eco-system. Within the charitable world, there are public charities and private
foundations. On the one hand, public charities tend to have a large public constituency to influence
the direction of the charity.224 Private foundations, on the other hand, are often so characterized by
having one very wealthy family who makes the primary donation to the organization and also
controls the organization.225 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Michael Bloomberg
Family Foundation are good examples. Because of this control by a wealthy family, Congress
imposes significant restrictions on the activities of private foundations,226 as compared to public
charities, and imposes greater limitations on the ability to donate to them as well.227
Charter schools automatically qualify for the more beneficial public charity status because
they are considered “educational organizations” under section 170 of the Code. 228 This fact is
important in itself for benefits available to it discussed in Part IV(B). But the private foundation
world is important to understanding the charter story as well. Private foundations are exempt from
tax as organizations described in section 501(c)(3) just like a charter school typically is, but the
primary activity private foundations engage in is grantmaking. Thus, a wealthy donor can
contribute substantial dollars to a private foundation and then make grants to carry out charitable
activities. Indeed, the evidence is that private foundation grants are a big part of the charter story.
For example, recent scholarship shows the way private foundation grants from wealthy
foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Broad Foundation, Kellogg
Janet James Mahon, Joint Ventures Between Non-Profit Organizations and For-Profit Organizations St. David’s
Case – Worthy Destination, but Road Under Construction, 56 TAX LAW. 845 (2003).
221
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222
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223
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224
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Foundation, and Ford Foundation have made big grants in education policy in local areas to move
education systems towards charter school models.229
To conclude this part, from the perspective of current law as long as a charter educates in
a primary and secondary educational context it should obtain and maintain tax exempt status. The
only way for it to lose that status is for someone who started the charter to be obviously running it
to benefit themselves while engaging in financial mismanagement at the same time. The IRS may
look at charters run by for-profit EMOs more closely but are highly likely to find those charters as
exempt except in egregious circumstances. As long as the charter enters a contract with the forprofit management company to run the school, and exercises oversight, it is unlikely that the IRS
will apply joint venture rules requiring the charity board to make the decisions regarding charitable
activity, despite the fact that the management company is making most of the educational
decisions.
B. Benefits of Classification as Charitable
Organizations that qualify as charitable because educational are allowed many federal tax
benefits such as exemption from income tax,230 the ability to receive tax deductible
contributions,231 and the ability to issue tax exempt bonds.232
First, a tax-exempt entity pays no tax on its income generally. With a current corporate tax
rate at 21 percent, if the charter school generated $100,000 in income in excess of its costs it would
not owe the corporate income tax on that activity, generating tax savings in the corporate form of
$21,000 that it could put back into its activity. The charity benefits from this state of affairs only
if it generates revenue in excess of expenses. To the extent the charity has such earnings, it
arguably receives a benefit from the government equivalent to the tax rate times the earnings.
The Supreme Court has stated that exemption amounts to a subsidy to the organization.233
That determination that exemption is a subsidy is not universally accepted. It depends upon
whether we believe a charity ought to pay tax on its corporate income. The most common reason
for taxing corporations is to apply a tax to the corporation’s shareholders. Because charities have
no shareholders and normally no one who appears to be a shareholder then we might contend we
ought not tax charities in a normal income tax.234 However, there are other reasons we might apply
a tax upon a corporation such as to regulate corporate manager power.235 Dan Halperin has
generally concluded that exemption is not a subsidy except in the case of investment income.236 I
discuss more about theories of exemption below in Part IV(C).
229
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system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.”); see also, Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588.
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Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115, 118 (2013)
[hereinafter What We Talk About].
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Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011) [hereinafter
Exemption a Subsidy].
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Second, such organizations are able to accept donor charitable contributions that are
deductible from the income tax.237 The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that from
2020 to 2024 the charitable contribution deduction for educational organizations will cost the
government about $41.6 billion.238 Because of high standard deductions from the federal income
tax, generally only relatively high-income donors are able to make use of the charitable
contribution deduction today.239 The Tax Policy Center estimates that recent legislation reduced
the number of households deducting their charitable contributions from 21% of households to
about 9% of households.240 There are many requirements to obtain a deduction from a charitable
contribution including that the contribution not be part of a quid pro quo241 and must be to an
eligible organization.242 If a donor contributes $100,000 in cash in the year, the donor can deduct
that $100,000 from their income assuming their adjusted gross income is sufficient.243 Top tax
rates work out to around a 40 percent rate meaning a high-income donor who donates $100,000
would save approximately $40,000 in federal income tax for that contribution.244 Another way of
thinking about the matter is that the government makes a $40,000 matching payment to a highincome donor’s $60,000 contribution. The donor may also save on state taxes. While there is
debate about whether tax exemption amounts to a subsidy, the dominant view is that the charitable
contribution deduction is a government subsidy for the charity.245
As noted, there are many limitations on the ability to deduct charitable contributions; one
limitation relates to the type of charity involved. There are more beneficial rules for donations to
public charities as compared to private foundations.246 Because charter schools automatically
qualify for public charity status as “educational organizations,” donors can obtain a fair market
value deduction for a contribution of an appreciated asset such as stock to a charter without
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Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 58 TAX LAWYER 331 (2015).
238
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well. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1).
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I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2021-45, 2021-48 IRB 764 (2021) https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-21-45.pdf.
245
Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777 (2012) (citing Jeff Strnad,
The Charitable Contributions Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in THE ECONOMICS OF NON-PROFIT
INSTITUTIONS, at 265, 273). The Supreme Court has stated that it is a subsidy as well. Bob Jones, Inc. That said,
some such as William Andrews have argued that the money set aside for charitable contributions are not really
income because set aside for collective purposes. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income
Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 344-75 (1972). See also Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the
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recognizing the gain inherent in the property.247 Also, as a public charity, private foundations can
make grants to the charter without being required to exercise expenditure responsibility. 248 This
makes seeking foundation grants much easier, and has been a significant source of funds for the
charter school movement. The Walton Family Foundation, for instance pledged $1 billion to
charters in 2016.249 The education sector received charitable contributions amounting to the second
most of the charitable sector at about $40 billion a year in 2010, though it was a distant second
compared to religious organizations.250
Third, charters might be able to issue debt upon which the holders will owe no tax, i.e., tax
exempt bonds.251 Depending on the laws of the state, the charter might alternatively issue taxexempt bonds as a governmental entity or have a section 501(c)(3) conduit issue them on its
behalf.252 So this benefit is a bit mixed in terms of whether it generates from charitable status or
not. Charters nationwide issued over $10 billion in tax exempt bonds between 1998 and 2017.253
Some of the benefits for charters include the issuance of this debt at low interest rates, typically a
longer term of borrowing than taxable debt, and the ability to finance up to one hundred per cent
of a facilities cost.254 There are many other tax credits and breaks that might be available to charter
operators such as taking advantage of New Market Tax Credits255 and Opportunity Zones.256
Historically, charitable status came with many benefits such as extensive liability
protection, extra bankruptcy protection, and limited application of antitrust law.257 Charities can
accept contributions that are exempted from the trust, gift, and estate taxes,258 have available less
complex retirement plans under section 403(b), and are exempt from the Unemployment Tax
Act,259 and the federal gambling tax.260 Additionally, there are many regulatory regimes that can
only be accessed as a result of being an organization described in section 501(c)(3). Often getting
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26 U.S.C.A. § 45D; see also Preston C. Green II, Bruce D. Baker & Joseph O. Oluwole, Are Charter Schools the
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used the New Markets Tax Credit to build charter schools).
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Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13823, 131 Stat. 2054, 2183-88 (2017) (codified at
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that designation from the IRS opens up numerous tax benefits including state income tax
exemption and sales and use tax exemptions.261
C. Theories for Subsidizing Charitable Activity through Tax Policy
As noted, there are numerous benefits that are accorded to charitable organizations that
qualify as exempt under section 501(c)(3). This section reviews literature supporting those benefits
through tax exemption and the charitable contribution deduction.
i.

Tax Exemption

Why does Congress exempt organizations that promote charitable purposes from the
income tax? Some argue the revenue these organizations generate is not income under an ideal
income tax, often identified as “income measurement theory.”262 The vast majority though view
exemption through an efficiency lens as a subsidy provided to generate some good with positive
externalities (“positive externality theories”). These theorists consider which positive externalities
should be furthered by the subsidy. Finally, there are some who argue that exemption subsidizes
or should subsidize civic benefits (“civic benefit theories”).
Noting that many who designed the exemption from federal income tax believed that
nonprofits did not earn profits that should be considered income under the Code, Bittker and
Rahdert argued that charities do not have the ability in most situations to calculate their income
for the income tax.263 To them donations are hard to conceptualize in an income tax as are the
gifts that a charity provides to its beneficiaries.264 The crux of this idea is that no income tax can
be owed on a nonprofits activity. Most have rejected this theory.265
Brody contends we exempt charities because we envision them as in part sovereign.266
Through the sovereignty lens we can see that the government simultaneously defers to the
charitable sector but also looks for ways to reduce its power.267 This idea could find a home in
the civic benefit theories, but it is here in income measurement theory because of the sense that
this call has on a charity’s income – it is all excluded. It would fit into the civic benefit bucket as
well because the sovereignty view has to be based in some conception that there is value in the
pluralistic liberal democratic model of allowing different charitable organizations to take
different approaches to common problems.268
If we assume instead that a charity’s income should fall within the corporate income tax,
what have scholars suggested justifies the exempt treatment? The traditional theory holds the
261

Mark A. Cowan, Nonprofits and the Sales and Use Tax, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1077 (2010).
Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976) [hereinafter Exemption of Nonprofit].
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See e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) [hereinafter The Rationale].
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Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585
(1998) [hereinafter Of Sovereignty].
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Of Sovereignty, supra note __ at 629.
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state ought provide a subsidy because the charitable activity benefits the state.269 Hansmann
posits market failure theory, a positive externality theory.270 There are some goods and services
that are subject to contract failure that the nonprofit form of organization structure including
what he calls the “nondistribution constraint” does some work to solve.271 The goal then of tax
exemption should be to identify those markets for goods and services that are subject to contract
failure and solvable through the nonprofit form. Critics argue the economic efficiency argument
fails to offer a limiting principle to what should be subsidized.272 Many also criticize the idea that
the nondistribution constraint actually solves the problem of trustworthiness.273 Finally, some
criticize the idea that all activities engaged in by charities are ones subject to underinvestment
and need to be subsidized.274
In another positive externality theory, Weisbrod argues that charities provide public
goods that neither the government nor the private market can provide.275 Because a government
is likely only to provide goods demanded by the median voter, there will always be dissatisfied
voters. The voluntary sector however is able to provide some of these types of goods. This is
often referred to as government failure theory. Weisbrod notes that much governmental activity
including education typically got its start in the voluntary sector.276 Saul Levmore suggests
something similar with respect to the charitable contribution deduction thinking of it as a voting
mechanism that allows donors to directly express their preferences for certain goods.277 Some
question the logic of the Weisbrod contention. Weisbrod assumes that there are really only two
choices: government provision of public goods or charitable provision. However, Galle points
out that in a federal system, citizens can move to a jurisdiction that might provide the public
good they want.278 This ability to move makes the subsidization theory inefficient in many
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Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (“A nonprofit organization
is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise
control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees”).
272
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Status, 41 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1006-1007 (1997).
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277
Saul Levmore, Taxes and Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 404-05 (1998); see also David M. Schizer, Charitable
Subsidies and Nonprofit Governance: Comparing the Charitable Deduction with the Exemption for Endowment
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circumstances as it incentivizes the person considering a welfare enhancing move to stay
instead.279
Some authors have argued that the exempt system and the charitable contribution
deduction should be designed to encourage civic benefits. The classic idea is that charitable tax
subsidies support pluralism in a democratic society.280 Rob Atkinson asserts government should
support altruism.281 More recently, Atkinson criticized his altruism theory because it focuses too
much on the giver and not the receiver; in the process, this problematically supports whatever
any particular individual supports.282 He suggests that it is possible to justify the exemption as a
celebration of a Toquevillian conception of democracy where the good is defined by individuals
by their giving in and of itself rather than the state.283 However, he thinks a more reasonable
justification lies in a neo-classical republican theory. Under this theory the state would put an
emphasis on providing public goods through the state rather than through charity because of the
effective tax such a choice places on the virtuous. He adopts a presumption that you cannot get
charitable benefits if the state provides a particular good or service.284
Reiser suggests that there is a problem with nonprofits not operating in a democratic
manner.285 She encourages us to make boards of nonprofits more democratic. In a similar civic
benefit vein Brennan calls for “a ‘contextual diversity’ theory of the charitable tax exemption.286
This means that the exemption should not just take the “aim of maximizing efficiency, but also . .
. the broader aim of advancing conceptions of justice that go beyond positive economic analysis
to include fairness and other ideas important to a democratic society.”287
Galston considered civic renewal theories including (1) encouraging cooperation, (2)
self-governance, (3) representation in a pluralist democracy, and (4) increasing the moral
character of the larger community.288 The cooperative idea means that the subsidy supports
people working in groups to develop a more trusting society that is more able to solve its
problems.289 The self-governance idea encourages citizens to actively discuss their collective
interests to arrive at democratically authentic solutions.290 The representation in a pluralist
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democracy hopes to increase citizen engagement within the representative political process.291
Finally, the moral perspective suggests that engaging more people in voluntary organization
work can build a stronger moral nation. Galston notes that civic renewal goals often conflict with
one another and that we must be clear which goal we are trying to further. Additionally, she
points out that empirical evidence neither supports the moral case nor the cooperative case.
Finally, Galston is skeptical that much can be done in the civic improvement sphere through
tax.292
Some claim that there is no reason charitable benefits ought to be provided to only
nonprofit organizations. Malani and Posner argue that for profit firms are more efficient
providers of goods and services and thus when they carry out charitable acts they ought to have
access to charitable benefits.293 At the least, they argue, the government should allow nonprofits
to provide nonprofit managers incentive pay to make nonprofits more efficient providers of
goods and services.294 Crimm similarly suggested jettisoning charitable tax subsidies for
hospitals and to instead just incentivize the activities we want from all hospitals.295 A number of
scholars pushed back against the Malani and Posner argument. Hines, Horwitz & Nichols argued
that there is no support for the claim that for profits are more efficient than nonprofits.296 They
additionally argued that allowing for profits to take advantage of charitable incentives would
create a significant opportunity for tax arbitrage.297 Galle argued that indeed we want more lowpowered incentives in the charity space because if we gave high-powered incentives it would
eliminate the warm-glow associated with charity and harm the benefits the charitable regime
provides such as monitoring the provision of public goods.298 This move to allow for-profits
access to charitable benefits is deeply related to another movement in this nonprofit/for-profit
space. Scholars have long discussed the convergence of for profit and nonprofit activities.299
Today, there is a burgeoning movement to consider more hybrid forms of charitable activity such
as the B corporation and L3C, entities that are for profit, but also have a social justice minded
mission.300
ii.

Charitable contribution theories

The predominant charitable contribution theory is that the contribution helps to subsidize
goods that are public in nature. When enacted in 1917 proponents argued it was needed so that
the income tax did not suppress giving to charity.301 Though exemption from tax is a different
policy, much of the tax-exempt theories find their cousin in the theory regarding the charitable
291
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contribution. Unlike tax exemption, it is generally accepted that the charitable contribution
deduction is a government subsidy.302 This is primarily based on the idea that charitable giving is
a form of consumption. The donor gets an exchange value of some sort in return for their giving.
Indeed, the Joint Committee on Taxation regularly includes the cost of the charitable
contribution deduction annually in its Tax Expenditure Budget.303 The biggest challenge the
charitable contribution suffers from is the contention that if it is a subsidy, it is an “upside down”
subsidy, where troublingly the wealthy get more of a subsidy than the poor.304 Under this
conception, a charitable contribution is no more than consumption by the wealthy individual
upon which they ought to properly pay income tax. For this reason, many have proposed
converting the deduction into a uniform credit instead.305
Like tax-exemption theories, one charitable contribution rationale includes a base
defining theory. Andrews argued that a primary purpose of the income tax is to set aside a certain
amount of total income for collective consumption and the other part for individual
consumption.306 To Andrews, a charitable contribution is not personal consumption and thus
ought not be taxed. Under these assumptions there is no upside-down subsidy because such
money is not properly in the income of the donor. Bittker similarly argued that a charitable
contribution could be a discharge of a moral obligation and thus legitimately excluded from the
donor’s income.307 Gergen criticizes Andrew’s theory as a simple repackaging of the subsidy
theory without providing any reason under which collective goods deserve to be considered not
income to a donor.308
Gergen argues that the deduction can be justified on two potential grounds: efficiency
and equity.309 His efficiency notion has a redistribution qualifier. Gergen argues that
contributions to churches do not satisfy efficiency as the evidence shows many church members
would give without regard to the deduction.310 But furthermore, there is likely to be little
redistribution within churches as churches tend to have equivalent socio-economic status
members.311 However, from an equity standpoint Gergen thought contributions to churches could
be justified; to Gergen the church contribution has little direct value to the giver, i.e., the giver
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gets little in economic return for their contribution.312 Gergen seems to mean by this that the
donor gets no consumption value from the contribution and thus ought not be taxed on it.
In an optimal tax analysis of the deduction, meaning that the only factor considered is the
efficiency of the deduction, Hochman and Rodgers applied a Pareto analysis to the deduction and
found that where the value of the contribution increases with the marginal rate it is nonoptimal.313 Applying a Lindahl model where the goal is to find the right tax to apply to determine
the benefit each person gets from the collective good, they argued though that a subsidy as a
uniform credit could be justified on the idea that the goods charities provide are public in nature
and thus provided at suboptimal levels. A government subsidy could help by solving the free
rider problem through voluntary mechanisms that allow the government to effectively solve
optimal provision of public goods through providing a tax credit to the donors. This analysis is
highly limited, though, because it assumes everyone involved wants each collective good chosen
through the charitable contribution deduction.
Though he recognized the implications of the Hochman Rogers analysis, Gergen found
that on the whole whether it be a credit or a deduction, the deduction should generally move us
towards a more efficient arrangement and thus the deduction can be justified because it moves us
closer to ideal levels of public goods.314 Strnad suggests that the charitable contribution might be
an opportunity at logrolling to get to a more efficient result. In other words, those who do not get
benefits can demand other tax benefits through the political process.315 Similarly, and
importantly, if we provide a charitable contribution deduction, we can offset the revenue loss by
raising rates within the marginal rate structure.316
A key piece of the efficiency conception of the charitable contribution is whether the
incentive even works. That record is quite mixed. Under an egoistic conception of charitable
contributions, government spending should crowd out charitable giving dollar for dollar.317 The
idea is that every dollar the government spends to help the poor stops a charitable contribution to
the benefit of the poor of $1. Studies show this is not correct.318 People contribute more to
charity than an economic free rider model would suggest. Another study found very low-price
elasticities for charitable giving suggesting that the contribution deduction had little to do with
incentivizing donors to contribute.319 Nevertheless, some studies suggest it can be efficient.
Feldstein and Taylor, for instance, found much greater price elasticity – between 1 and 1.5.320
312
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Feldstein in another study shows that the elasticity as to giving is different depending on the type
of organization.321 Giving to churches is relatively inelastic while giving to hospitals and
educational organizations is highly elastic.322 More recent studies have had very mixed results
showing price elasticities between .5 and 1.26.323 Importantly, if the price elasticity is closer to
.5, a reduction in the contribution deduction amount would have positive returns to the
Treasury.324
There are a number of other problems for the efficiency case. Tax salience studies show
that taxpayers often are either not aware of the subsidy or they underestimate its value. Goldin
and Yair found that over half of people eligible for the deduction were unaware of its existence,
and those who were aware underestimated its value.325 Complicating things more, Faulhaber
discusses the likelihood that the deduction is hypersalient.326 By this she means there is a great
likelihood that people believe they can take the deduction when they cannot.327
McCormack notes that though many supporters point to the positive externalities
associated with charitable activity to support the deduction, contributions also cause negative
externalities.328 For instance, providing a subsidy for a contribution to a group that advocates
white supremacy likely is not an efficient subsidy because even if there are positive externalities,
there are significant negative externalities involved.329 Galle suggests another problem with the
government failure theory with multiple governments in a federal system already mentioned
above.330 To the extent that the subsidy complicates the choice of a citizen in deciding whether to
move to a governmental jurisdiction that provides a better mix of goods, the subsidy actually
causes inefficiency rather than efficiency.
Fleischer argues the charitable tax subsidy theories developed so far presented only weak
normative justification.331 Both the efficiency theorists and the pluralist theorists as she referred
to them fail to consider broader philosophical goals, such as libertarianism, utilitarianism and
equal opportunity.332 Fleischer argues for a need to engage in conversations about distributive
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justice as we consider these theories, because distributive justice is fundamental to charity.333 In
looking at the possibility of utilizing equal opportunity theories, Fleischer found that there are a
range of these philosophies and each one may offer different approaches.334 In general, Fleischer
seems to have found that much of the equal opportunity literature would push towards charitable
tax subsidies that did more to level up the poor.335 But she also found that it might also find that
hospitals by reviving those with disabilities might indeed be acting as charitable in that very act
because they are righting a situation that puts the disabled at a significant disadvantage compared
to others.336
Thus, there are two primary threads of the normative debate over tax exemption and
charitable contribution tax policy. A claim that the policies either improve market efficiency or
that there is an equity to the policy. The market efficiency threads focus on whether we can get
closer to a perfect free market outcome by utilizing tax-exemption for charities or providing the
charitable contribution deduction. The goods and services involved must either be public goods
or be goods that have some positive externality that are not expected to be supplied at a sufficient
level under normal market conditions. It is far from clear that either tax exemption or the
charitable contribution deduction as currently designed furthers efficiency. There is a good bit of
evidence that it fails on efficiency on a number of fronts. In terms of equity, the design of the
charitable contribution deduction that is provided to a very narrow group of donors, most of
whom are wealthy, makes the equity argument hard to make. Most who try to make this
argument realize that exemption and the contribution deduction would need to be reorganized in
a way that ensured more redistribution from wealthy to poor than is currently the case.
V.

ANALYSIS

This Article seeks to determine whether income tax subsidies to charter schools are
warranted. The focus is on two different tax policies: tax exemption and the charitable
contribution deduction. Instead of focusing solely on typical tax policy criteria of efficiency and
equity, I argue that political justice is an important value that ought to be considered as well.
A. Tax Exemption
This part considers what theories such as base, efficiency, equity, and political justice
might portend for providing exemption from the income tax to charter schools.
If a charity is due exemption from the corporate income tax in a normal income tax under
income measurement theory,337 there is little to say about charters and tax exemption. But it
makes little sense to say that a charter cannot account for the money it earns for providing a
service to students. It may be complex, but no more complex than lots of other service
businesses.338 Brody’s sovereignty theory may have some hold here given that the organization is
directly carrying out work on behalf of the government. But it does not explain much since
333
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plenty organizations contract to conduct government business, including education, and still pay
tax. Perhaps the corporate tax is intended to be a tax on shareholders alone, and the lack of
shareholders in a charity means charitable organization earnings ought not be part of the base.339
But, any such base defining theory must first find which goods and services belong within a
conception of being outside the base of an income tax; none of these theories explain why this
particular provision of education through a charter falls into that realm.
What about efficiency theories? These are described at positive externality theories
above. Hansmann’s market failure theory may help some. Is there a contract failure associated
with primary and secondary education? As discussed in Part III(B) there is agreement that either
primary and secondary education provides a public good or the service comes with significant
positive externalities. The primary public good is a populace capable of engaging in selfgovernance. Without a forced collective solution, parents will underinvest in primary and
secondary education that is ideal from a societal perspective. Parents will either free ride on the
fact that the good is provided, or not invest in the right level of education because they will not
recoup the cost through the benefits they receive from the investment. This means that the U.S. is
unlikely to obtain the right level of primary and secondary education without some economic
intervention. There is also an element of contract failure that Hansmann discusses, i.e., situations
where individuals are purchasing services, such as international relief, for a third party. With
primary and secondary schooling, parents acquire education for their children and are reliant on
the school to provide services that the parent is not able to observe. A nonprofit structure may be
more trustworthy than a for-profit in ensuring that these services are provided to the children.
Problematically, for the charter case, market failure theory focuses on whether a
nonprofit would provide the service more efficiently than would a for-profit organization.340 A
nonprofit might provide the service more efficiently than a for profit because of the nondistribution constraint placed on the nonprofit. But the government operates public schools and
similarly has a non-distribution constraint. Additionally, by utilizing the power to tax, the
government has already solved the market issues involved in the provision of primary and
secondary education.
The better question thus is whether the nonprofit can provide the service more efficiently
than the government. Under typical conceptions this would likely mean that the nonprofit can
provide greater quality for the same amount of money or less than the government can. Chubb
and Moe argue that the government system is highly inefficient because of bureaucracy.341
Schools could be more efficient if those burdens were lifted and more control were provided to
single schools as is often the case with charters.342 Based on results of charters generally not
outperforming public schools, it’s not clear this prognostication is correct.343 Though there may
be some charters that we might be able to agree are more efficient as to quality and cost than
government run schools, the evidence is against the case that this generally holds true. As a
matter of theory though, it’s worthwhile observing that the contract failure theory simply does
not apply to nonprofits providing government services like in the case of charters. Given that
this is a lot of the work of the charitable sector, we likely need new efficiency theories to explain
why we might prefer nonprofits to the government in these situations.
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A related problem for using market failure theory to solve the charter school question is
that once a contract failure is observed the question turns to whether a nonprofit’s lack of owners
makes it difficult for the nonprofit to obtain the right level of resources. This analysis is
conducted in comparison to a for-profit organization that has the opportunity to see out equity
investors. For instance, a large portion of hospitals are organized as charitable organizations.
While some hospitals, like rural ones, experience challenge in raising the needed resources,
many urban hospitals likely have little difficulty raising money making providing a benefit to
them inefficient. What does the market look like for charters? As public schools, charters receive
significant funding from the government based on the district in which they operate. With such
robust funding, it is unlikely that charters are lacking in the ability to raise funds because of their
nonprofit status. Perhaps efficiencies are gained by the charter spending money differently than a
public school, but there is no reason to believe this is the case. Indeed, the charter schools may
harm access to education to non-charter students if they draw money away from the public
school system generally. Studies show increases in charter school government funding
sometimes comes with decreased ability of the community public schools to stay solvent.344
Another challenge to applying the theory is determining the service or good to evaluate.
Is a charter providing the service of education, or is it instead housing assets, receiving, and
disbursing funds, and providing a governance structure for contracting with a management
company? Arguably, a charter is like a mini-school board for one school that contracts out most
decisions to a management company. It is not clear that there is a market failure in those
services. This highlights some of the challenge of utilizing market failure theory – utilizing a
broad category like education may disguise the service or good actually being provided by the
nonprofit.
It may be that charters could provide an efficiency by generating more donations in
districts that are severely lacking in funds than the public school system. A complication to such
a claim is that public schools have the ability to attract charitable dollars just like the nonprofit
charters. One recent study showed that public schools attracted modestly more non-public dollars
such as from philanthropy per pupil than did charter schools.345 That said, as discussed in Part
II(B), charters tend to service a larger number of minority and poor students than do public
schools. Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence that charter schools have the potential to
generate more private foundation grants.346 In New Orleans, for instance, according to one study
charter schools operate on a more than $24,000 per pupil budget, while the public schools
operate on less than $12,000 per pupil.347 This difference is attributed to attracting voluntary
contributions and private foundation grants.348 However, testing results from that school system
do not suggest the extra funds have made a difference: “on average, the other school systems in
the state have 31% of students achieving proficiency in the 4 basic subjects tested. This
compares to 18% achieving proficiency in the new reformed Orleans system.”349
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In the end, market failure theory is not a great fit for examining this question. Though the
idea of education and its market challenges fit within the range of services that a charity might
excel at providing, because the government already solves the problem with tax dollars, the
theory does not aid in solving how to think about a new question: whether a nonprofit charity
might be more efficient at providing education through tax dollars than the government.
Nevertheless, a potential ability to more efficiently use its charitable status to attract dollars to
the cause of primary and secondary education could support in part granting the benefit of taxexemption to charters. The evidence is not strong for this claim though.
How does government failure theory fare? Though it has a superficial relationship, it is
not a great fit. Under this theory, it is assumed that the government only provides the services that
the median voter wants; some people want different services than what the government
provides.350 The government can consider offering some more modest support through charitable
tax subsidies to aid such minority voter endeavors. It is an odd fit for charters as again this is the
government in part operating through a nonprofit itself. If charters provide a service desired by the
non-median voter, then the government does not just provide services of the median voter. It is
hard to know how we could determine whether any charity is in fact providing some service desired
by a non-median voter that actually enhances efficiency in the goods and services collectively
offered. Charters use the idea of market competition to achieve a type of efficiency of providing
underprovided types of education. Perhaps charters can prove the need and efficiency in part by
whether parents choose a particular school over others, or by showing that charters are able to help
with some particular undersupplied type of education in the relevant market. Still, if as mentioned
above the movement of money from the school district to the charter school harms the relevant
budget as to other students it may be that overall, the charter is harming that type of efficiency.
What about theories of equity? In a typical tax equity question, we might consider
whether those who should be taxed associated with a particular activity are being taxed at the
right rate. One comparison is between how other nonprofit primary and secondary schools are
taxed. Private nonprofit schools are widely exempted from the income tax as charitable
organizations. This factor would point toward allowing public charters to also be exempted from
the income tax. The analysis would not stop there though because the nonprofit itself of course
bears no tax – it is the people associated with the nonprofit that might bear tax. Thus, many ask
whether the beneficiaries ought to pay a tax at the corporate rate of the charity. In the case of
charter schools, if that is the right metric, given that charters tend to serve a poorer population
than traditional public schools, not applying a tax to charter schools would seem a reasonable
result. But this is not the right analysis because in the charter situation the taxpayers of a
community are paying the cost. It is possible that either the community would pay the tax, or it
would reduce services. But that also fails to consider the question of who is likely to bear the
incidence of the corporate tax in the case of charters. It is possible it could be born by those who
provide the services to the charter, i.e., those who control the management company. This would
happen if those managing the school obtained a smaller return as the result of a corporate income
tax being imposed on the activity. Thus, it is impossible to know who would bear the tax
involved and this equity analysis does not provide much help.
If the question of equity is instead whether charters redistribute wealth from wealthy to
poor individuals, the case is not strong. There is no reason to believe that the charter system is
redistributing wealth. Charters primarily use tax dollars meaning they add nothing to
redistribution in the main case. They may even subject that money to more opportunities for
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loss.351 It seems likely at least that it is more costly to monitor separate nonprofit organizations
than the public school system.352 Also as discussed in Part II(A), because of how it draws
funding, we know that public education is not a major motivating force of redistribution.
Wealthy districts simply have more resources available than poor districts, and charters do not
change this reality. It is possible that the charter system results in more money going to wealthy
interests, through paying charter management organizations rather than supporting the traditional
public school system. If the individuals who are controlling the organization are the ones
benefitting from any subsidy of exemption, the fact that some lower income students benefit in
part from access to the charter school does not make the system redistributive. As noted above,
possibly charters are more effective than public schools at generating private foundation grants
and voluntary contributions. Again, this equity case is unclear.
What about civic benefit theories? Atkinson has both made a liberal democratic case for
charity and a neo-classical republican case for charity.353 The liberal theory accepted that a
benefit of our charitable tax subsidies is that they were neutral and allowed individuals to pick
and further the good in a liberal democratic pluralistic model. More recently Atkinson has argued
for a neo-classical republican theory where the state primarily decides the good. Under this
conception, as mentioned above, where the state already provides a service we should establish a
presumption against using a nonprofit to accomplish the role. It is hard to figure out how these
conceptions cut within the charter school model. The charter is the government, but just the
government using a nonprofit to carry out its activities. On the whole though, if the motivation is
the republican conception that the state has the ability to determine the good for society, then it
seems likely that under this theory providing charitable subsidies to charters might be
problematic. Arguably Brennen’s approach of contextual diversity to consider fairness and other
ideas important to democratic society would similarly find interest in the state carrying out this
activity.
From the political justice standpoint, even if charter schools redistributed wealth and
even if they had some enhancements of quality, it is not clear we should favor them. If the
system takes decisional control away from communities over a core democratic function of
primary and secondary education and gives it to wealthy interests through private foundation and
management company control, we might find a political justice harm. Though there is a
movement from wealthy individuals to poor meeting normal distributive justice concerns, the
consequent removal over the power of those communities to shape the educational life on their
own is a significant political justice harm to that community all the same.354
So, what might political justice have to say on the question of tax-exemption for charters?
Political justice demands that tax policy not harm PVE, and that also it can be used to enhance
351
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PVE.355 PVE matters on any decision involving a collective activity, and even more so when it is
core to a democratic function. Where the matter is influence over public representation or
legislation that is before our representatives, we should have particular concern regarding PVE.356
Thus, where tax policy enhances the political interests of small wealthy business interest groups
through exemption for business leagues, we should reconsider such policy because it gives more
political voice to the most powerful interests and little to no help at all to lower income diffuse
interests.357 Such policy does harm by exacerbating differences in political power that exists
naturally. Similarly, we might maintain and enhance tax benefits for labor interests who experience
significant collective action problems and objectively are not well-represented before our political
system.358
As developed in Part III(C) the activity overseen by a charter is core democratic collective
activity. This activity ought to be collectively shaped. The process itself serves as an example to
students about the deep cooperation needed to operate a democratic order and uses the one process
that allows the local community to have a voice in shaping the values taught by the school. Upon
the authorization of a charter school, that control is mostly turned over to whoever controls the
charter.
Granting federal government support to a charter through tax exemption harms PVE by
giving aid to policy that undermines core local democratic activity. Choices that a typically elected
school board typically made and oversaw before are handed to individuals who win charter
authorization: charter board members and the charter’s management organization. Most
educational charter decisions are made by CMOs or EMOs. There is some governmental oversight,
but primarily on whether to revoke the charter or not. There are some state and federal laws that
continue to apply to these organizations, but the fundamental decision on values to teach and how
to educate are left to the charter itself. The local community thus loses its right to make decisions
about the school, even as to validly passed laws regarding the operation of public schools, but the
community still supports that school through tax dollars and other benefits that come with the
charitable designation. Additionally, by losing this process the students fail to learn about
cooperation essential to a community that is democratic and fail to be taught community values
that have been shaped by a democratic process.
As discussed above, some efforts on charter schools include efforts to eliminate teachers
unions. Many charters thus bring in new teachers some of whom have no certification to teach and
most of whom are non-union members. As discussed in Part III(C), teachers and unions can play
a key role in maintaining non-repression of minority students and their ideas that are so critical to
a democratic order. Where we begin to dismantle that system, those protections may also begin to
fall apart. Thus, this breaking down of the traditional public school and de-professionalizing
teachers comes with another significant cost to PVE.
These harms to PVE suggests that we should reconsider the adoption of charters. Given
that this case supports the greater, i.e., of ending the adoption of charters, it could also warrant
choosing to end exemption from tax. However, forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the
Federal government adopted the charter system through democratic means.359 Under these
circumstances, ending tax-exemption for charter schools while maintaining it for primary and
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secondary education seems likely the wrong direction. But, at the same time it is problematic to
allow the charitable tax system to further governmental systems that avert democratic control.
School choice through charters allows the potential for very local control. That is part of
the appeal of “choice.” Ostensibly a parent gets more educational choice for their children through
market mechanisms. This is not a democratic form of control though.360 Considering the harm to
PVE furthered by tax policy itself by supporting this arrangement, we could adopt rules for taxexemption that foster a more democratic charter operation. I consider solutions in Part V(C).
B. Charitable Contribution Deduction
This Part V(B) considers the theories regarding the charitable contribution deduction from
the perspective of base, efficiency, equity, and political justice. The arguments are similar to
exemption arguments, but because a distinctly different policy the arguments take somewhat
different form. Nevertheless, the right to the charitable contribution deduction flows directly from
the choice to exempt an organization from tax. It is one of the many benefits that come from that
designation.
Few accept the base argument of Andrews. He claims that these contributions are not
properly within the base of the income tax because the donor does not use the money for personal
consumption. As developed in Part IV(C)(ii), most however see that there is an element of
consumption to the donation and also argue that the theory does not help us to determine what
activities are legitimate common goods or services. Of course, in the case of primary and secondary
education we do have some agreement that the state has some significant duty to provide this
service. Nevertheless, in the case of charters, evidence shows a lot of the money coming through
the charitable contribution deduction is coming in great quantity from a narrow group of private
foundations engaged in trying to shape policy to their interests.361 This suggests there is a personal
consumption element to these contributions. Thus, the base argument does not help much.
What about the charitable contribution efficiency argument? Education is certainly a public
good or a good with positive externalities that could be legitimately furthered through the
charitable contribution deduction. Whether the deduction is efficient for charter schools depends
upon whether the contributions made are encouraged through the contribution deduction itself.
The evidence, discussed in Part IV(C)(ii), is not strong that the charitable contribution actually is
efficient in this sense. It depends on the activity. If price elasticity is low, then we have no reason
to believe the donor is giving more to education than they would if the government just taxed them
and gave the money to education itself. One thing that complicates this question further is that the
alternative is not a for profit operator but a government operator. A local government can also
accept charitable contributions, meaning that it would be hard to show that charters as a structure
are more efficient at seeking out charitable contributions than is the public school system.
What about equity? As a subsidy that supports only about nine percent of taxpayers and
supports wealthy taxpayers with a greater deduction, the equity of the tax policy itself is hard to
support. The government only is choosing to support the charitable interests of a very select group
of people and this is far from equitable. Given that charters tend to supply their services to lower
income students than the typical public school, it is possible that this results in some redistribution
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of wealth. Again, it is not clear that charters are accomplishing this goal as the government has the
same ability to attract these types of dollars.
Finally, reviewing the charitable contribution deduction through a political justice lens,
shows the deep problem with having such a deduction only for those with high incomes. Only
high-income individuals and those with control over private foundation wealth are really
incentivized by this system to make contributions. This in turn means that the charters who are
educating the children of our community can be expected to be taught the values these high-income
and wealthy interests are interested in pushing. The problem does not stop there. Our tax policy is
designed to provide subsidies for these contributions, but not for ordinary citizens. It means the
government is enhancing the collective activity choices of high-income donors with substantial
dollars, but it provides nothing to those choices of the other over 90% of taxpayers. That cannot
be just, even if it is “efficient,” and even if it does redistribute income.
C. Possible Solutions to the Harm to PVE
Congress has adopted rules of a democratic nature to apply to the charitable sector before.
As noted in Part IV(A), Congress considers public charities, which have a broad public
constituency, more legitimate charities than private foundations.362 This is a recognition of the
importance of broad community voice in carrying out collective activity. Congress requires a taxexempt organization to broadly disclose information about its activities on an annual basis.363 It
does this in part to serve a democratic accountability function. 364 Congress requires credit
counseling organizations to have independent members on its board to ensure a board that more
consistently takes the larger community into mind, rather than the narrow interests of individuals
interested in profiting from the operation.365 Congress requires hospitals to study and publicly
report on community health needs.366 Each of these is an effort to allow more community voice
and input into the activities of charitable organizations. These are moves that enhance the political
justices of the charitable tax subsidies.
Congress should consider similar provisions for charter schools. Congress could require a
charter to conduct a localized community education needs assessment and publish that every three
to five years. This could provide the democratic value of transparency. Additionally, including
community members on the board of the charter with a vote could both make the charter operation
more democratically accountable and an organization that is cooperatively shaping the policies of
the charter rather than accepting the control by those who form the charter. Including children who
are old enough a non-voting position on the board could be of value as well in demonstrating the
cooperation necessary to run a democratic order. Teachers too ought to be represented on the board
of the charter. Furthermore, because the charter board itself often does not run the organization on
a day-to-day basis, Congress would need to require nonprofit charter management organizations
to adopt the same type of democratically led board. It should also consider prohibiting a charitable
charter from entering into a contract with a for-profit charter for similar reasons. These latter
organizations are making significant collective educational decisions and are influenced in those
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decisions more in meeting their fiduciary duty to earn a profit rather than to represent the interest
of the community at large.
Community boards are no panacea. Within the public company realm, evidence shows
adopting independent directors has not ensured that those directors fulfill their function of
stopping a corporate board from taking actions in the interest of those who control the
organization.367 So I make these recommendations with recognition of its imperfection. I also
accept that allowing the public to engage in long deliberative political debate may not wind up
with the best solutions. It does not necessarily improve the quality of participation. As such, it is
possible that greater deliberation may lead to worse outcomes.368 Because of our diverse,
pluralistic society, some may argue we are better off with many groups getting to choose their
paths on education separately, rather than forcing communities to resolve the question of how to
best educate children.369 I do not accept this pessimism and continue to believe the best method
of deciding collective choices lies in a fair democratic process. Finally, I also recognize that
allowing small homogenous groups to decide for the group may lead to “conformity, intolerance
and the personalization of politics.”370 This will continue to be a problem as it already is today,
but I have the hope that educating our children in a true democratic way can lead to a real
understanding that our cooperation with one another to govern ourselves is both important and
can only be done when we do not bring these forces of exclusion to the table.
What does this analysis suggest for the rest of the charitable sector? First, scholars should
reconsider our charitable tax exemption theories in light of the fact that around a third of money
that goes to charities comes from government contracts.371 We tend to think of charity as an
independent third sector that carries out voluntary activity on its own and raises money from
individuals to carry out that work. But many charities like charters are private nonprofit groups
contracted to do work on behalf of the government. Thus, the lack of owners from whom to seek
operating capital is lessened in these circumstances. The question becomes more whether
charitable organizations are more efficient at carrying out the contract activity than would a forprofit organization or the government itself. This would be a refocus of the charitable tax policy
agenda.
Second, and relatedly, Congress should look more closely at policies allowing exemption
for organizations engaged in such governmental activities. The policy allows government
support for government activities that are typically conducted by nonprofits non-democratically.
This may cause harm to PVE. The question is one of whether the activity involved is one that
should be democratically shaped. Where it is a distinct service that has little judgment calls that
call for a collective answer, it is unlikely that Congress needs to be involved. One might consider
for instance whether a hospital is involved in activity that needs collective judgment calls. Those
judgment calls are not as significant to collective choice as primary and secondary education, but
there is good reason to believe the larger community has interest in how a hospital decides to
service the community.
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Third, it suggests Congress ought to reconsider requirements for private primary and
secondary schools to obtain charitable tax-exemption. This is core democratic activity, that
should be more democratically conceived. Without looking closer at the specific issues of private
education it is impossible to come to any conclusions here. Religious schools present particularly
tough challenges. Nevertheless, charitable tax subsidies for private primary and secondary
schools should be reconsidered in light of PVE concerns.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The charter case viewed through a political justice analysis suggests that impact on PVE
can help us think through ways to better target policies of tax exemption and the charitable
contribution deduction. Efficiency and equity are helpful factors, but alone they fail to provide a
complete analysis. The case shows that Congress should require more from charitable
organizations than prohibit shareholders and identify a good purpose that either is “efficient” or
redistributes wealth. Community decisional power matters too. It matters particularly in cases of
core democratic activity such as primary and secondary education. It would be better if neither
Congress nor states adopted the charter model. Because they adopted this model through
democratic means, and education is accepted as a core charitable purpose, we should not end
charitable tax subsidies for these organizations. However, it makes good sense to use tax policy
to provide greater democratic accountability for these organizations that are training our children
to be a part of our democratic order.
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